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WILLIAM L. PROSSERt
"Tn. assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these days apace."
So said Cardozo in 1931,1 and has been much quoted since. With the passage
of nearly thirty years, a goodly part of the citadel still holds out; but the
assault goes on with unabated vigor. It is the purpose of this Article to in-
quire, how goes the battle, in one very important and more or less separate
area of the fight, where the seller of chattels defends against the ultimate
consumer, with whom he stands in no privity of contract.
,One major bastion, that of negligence liability, has been carried long since, and
its guns turned inward upon the defenders. Another, that of the strict liability
of the seller of food and drink, is hard pressed and sore beset, and may even
now be tottering to its fall. Elsewhere along the battlements there have been
minor breaches made, but the defense is yet stout. War correspondents with
the beleaguering army 2 are issuing daily bulletins, proclaiming that the siege
is all but over. From within the walls comes the cry, not so; we have but
begun to fight.3 Watchman, what of the night?
The tale of the storming of the heights of negligence has been told too often
for any need to repeat it here 4 In 1842 Lord Abinger foresaw "the most
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Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability InMrance, 57 YALE L.J. 549 (1948);
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tive Remedies, 27 N.Y.U.L. REv. 537 (1952); McNiece & Thornton, Is the Law of
Negligence Obsolete? 26 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 255 (1952); James, Some Reflections on the
Bases of Strict Liability, 18 LA. L. REv. 293 (1958).
3. Peairs, The God in, the Machine, 29 B.U.L. REv. 37 (1949); Plant, Strict Liability
of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in Products-An Opposing Vicu; 24
TErxn. L. REv. 938 (1957).
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dees, 45 L.Q. REv. 343 (1929) ; Feezer, Tort Liability of Manufacturers and Vendors, 10
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absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I can see no limit,",, if it should
ever be held that the defendant who made a contract with A would be liable
to B for 'his failure to perform that contract properly. What happened in the
next century was enough to make the learned jurist turn in his grave. The
courts began by the usual process of developing exceptions to the "general
rule" of nonliability to persons not in privity. The most important of these
was that the seller of a chattel owed to any one who might be expected to
use it a duty of reasonable care to make it safe, provided that the chattel was
"inherently" or "imminently" dangerous. In 1916 there came the phenomenon
of the improvident Scot who squandered his gold upon a Buick, and so left
his name forever imprinted upon the law of products liability. Cardozo,
wielding a mighty axe, burst over the ramparts, and buried the general rule
under the exception. "If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably
certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing
of danger." 6
During the suceeding years this decision swept the country, and with the
barely possible but highly unlikely exceptions of Mississippi 7 and Virginia,8
no American jurisdiction now refuses to accept it. The rule of the MacPherson
case was extended by degrees. It was extended to property damage,9 even
when it was caused by chattels such as animal food which involved no recog-
Vendees, 24 VA. L. REv. 134 (1937); James, Products Liability, 34 TEXAS L. REv. 192
(1955); Wilson, Products Liability, 43 CALIF. L. Rzv. 614, 809 (1955), Noel, Products
Liability of a Manufacturer in Tennessee, 22 TFNN. L. REV. 985 (1953).
The most comprehensive study of both negligence and strict liability, still valuable
after nearly twenty years, is the Report of the New York Law Revision Commission on
Products Liability for Breach of Warranty and Negligence, N.Y. LEG. Doe. No. 65, at
413-73 (1943), which was the work of Professor Ehrenzweig.
5. Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 114, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (Exeh.
1842).
6. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 389, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916).
7. The last Mississippi holding rejected the MacPherson case. Ford Motor Co. v.
Myers, 151 Miss. 73, 117 So. 362 (1928). In E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Ladner,
221 Miss. 378, 73 So. 2d 249 (1954), the court intimated, without deciding, that it might
be accepted. In Mason v. American Emery Wheel Works, 241 F.2d 906 (1st Cir. 1957),
the federal court concluded that Mississippi would now accept the case.
8. The Supreme Court of Virginia has continued to avoid the issue, and leave open
the question whether the "modern rule" will be applied in that state. Robey v. Richnuond
Coca-Cola Bottling Works, Inc., 192 Va. 192, 64 S.E.2d 723 (1951); H. M. Gleason &
Co. v. International Harvester Co., 197 Va. 255, 88 S.E.2d 904 (1955). In Pierce v. Ford
Motor Co., 190 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1951), the federal court concluded that Virginia has
in reality adopted the rule.
9. Todd Shipyards Corp. v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 609 (D. Me. 1947); United
States Radiator Corp. v. Henderson, 68 F.2d 87 (10th Cir. 1933) ; Marsh Wood Prods.
Co. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 207 Wis. 209, 240 N.W. 392 (1932); Genesee County
Patrons Fire Relief Ass'n v. L. Sonneborn Sons, 263 N.Y. 463, 189 N.E. 551 (1934) ;
C. D. Herme, Inc. v. R. C. Tway Co., 294 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1956); Gosnell v. Zink, 325
P.Zd 965 (Okla. 1958).
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nizable risk of personal injury.'0 It was extended beyond the purchaser, to
protect his employees1 and the members of his family, ' as well as subse-
quent purchasers ' 3 and other users of the chattel,14 and casual bystanders 15
and others "in the vicinity of its probable use.""' On the defendant's side it
was extended to include makers of component parts ' 7 and assemblers of
parts,1 8 and those who put their names upon goods made by others,' and
sellers who were not and did not purport to be manufacturers at all. 0 The
rule has long since been extended to repairmen who do work on the chattel,2 1
10. Cohan v. Associated Fur Farms, Inc., 261 Wis. 584, 53 N.WV.2d 783 (1952);
Dunn v. Purina Co., 38 Tenn. App. 229, 272 S.W.2d 479 (1954); Brown v. Bigelow, 325
Mass. 4, 88 N.E.2d 542 (1949) ; Ellis v. Lindmark, 177 Minn. 390, 225 N.W. 395 (1929) ;
Pine Grove Poultry Farm, Inc. v. Newtown By-Prods. Mffg. Co., 248 N.Y. 293, 162 N.E.
84 (1928).
11. Rosebrock v. General Elec. Co., 236 N.Y. 227, 140 N.E. 571 (1923); Marsh
Wood Prods. Co. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 207 Wis. 209, 240 N.W. 392 (1932) (dictum) :
Kalash v. Los Angeles Ladder Co., 1 Cal. 2d 229, 34 P2d 481 (1934) (dictum); O'Don-
nell v. Geneva 'etal Wheel Co., 183 F2d 733 (6th Cir. 1950).
12. White Sewing Mach. Co. v. Feisel, 28 Ohio App. 152, 162 N.E. 633 (1927);
Baker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 16 F. Supp. 925 (S.D. Cal. 1936).
13. Beadles v. Servel, Inc., 344 Ill. App. 133, 100 N.E.2d 405 (1951); Quackenbush
v. Ford Motor Co., 167 App. Div. 433, 153 N.Y. Supp. 131 (1915); State ex rel Wood-
zell v. Garzell Plastics Indus., Inc., 152 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Mich. 1957).
14. Hoenig v. Central Stamping Co., 273 N.Y. 485, 6 N.E.2d 415 (1936); Lili v.
Murphy Door Bed Co., 290 Ill. App. 328, 8 N.E.2d 714 (1937); Reed & Barton Corp.
N% Maas, 73 F2d 359 (1st Cir. 1934) ; Coakley v. Prentiss-Wabers Stove Co., 182 Wis.
94, 195 N.W. 388 (1923).
15. McLeod v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 318 Mo. 397, 1 S.W.2d 122 (1927); Statler
v. George A. Ray Mffg. Co., 195 N.Y. 478, 88 N.E. 1063 (1909) (dictum); Hopper v.
Charles Cooper & Co., 104 N.J.L. 93, 139 Atl. 19 (Ct. of Err. & App. 1927).
16. REsTATm znnT, TORTS § 395; Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick Co., 196 WVis. 196, 218 N.W.
855 (1928); Gaidry 'Motors, Inc. v. Brannon, 268 S.W.2d 6277 (Ky. 1954); Carpini v.
Pittsburgh & Weirton Bus Co., 216 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1954); Whitehead v. Republic
Gear Co., 102 F.2d 84 (9th Cir. 1939) (dictum); Ford Motor Co. v. Zahn, 265 F2d 729
(8th Cir. 1959).
17. Smith v. Peerless Glass Co., 259 N.Y. 292, 181 N.E. 576 (1932); Spencer v.
Madsen, 142 F2d 820 (10th Cir. 1944); State ex rel. Woodzell v. Garzell Plastics In-
dus., Inc., 152 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Ifich. 1957).
18. Sheward v. Virtue, 20 Cal. 2d 410, 126 P.2d 345 (1942).
19. Burkhardt v. Armour & Co., 115 Conn. 249, 161 At. 385 (1932) ; Swift & Co. v.
Hawkins, 174 Miss. 253, 164 So. 231 (1935); Armour & Co. v. Leasure, 177 Md. 393, 9
A.2d 572 (1939) ; Swift & Co. v. Blackwell, 84 F.2d 130 (4th Cir. 1936) : Slavin v. Francis
H. Leggett & Co., 114 N.J.L. 421, 177 Atl. 120 (Sup. Ct 1935), aff'd per curiam, 117
N.J.L. 101, 186 Atl. 832 (Ct. Err. & App. 1936).
20. Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick Co., 196 Wis. 196, 218 N.W. 855 (1928); Gaidry Motors,
Inc. v. Brannon, 268 S.W.2d 627 (Ky. 1954) ; see Bock v. Truck & Tractor, Inc., 18 Wash.
2d 458, 139 P.2d 706 (1943) ; Jones v. Raney Chevrolet Co., 217 N.C. 693, 9 S.X.2d 395
(1940).
21. Hudson v. 1foonier, 94 F2d 132 (8th Cir. 1938), affd, 102 F.2d 96 (8th Cir.
1939) ; Kalinowski v. Truck Equipment Co., 237 App. Div. 472, 261 N.Y. Supp. 657 (1933):
Dahms v. General Elevator Co., 214 Cal. 733, 7 P2d 1013 (1932); Vrooman v. Beech
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and, in many states, to building contractors. 2 It 'has become, in short, a general
rule imposing negligence liability upon any supplier, for remuneration, of any
chattel.2
Only two small islands of resistance continue to hold out, in subterranean
chambers. New York 24 and three or four other courts 25 still talk the language
of "inherent danger," and refuse to find liability for normally harmless and
inoffensive objects, such as a bed, or a can with a key. It is by no means
clear, however, that these decisions mean to say more than that, upon the
facts of the particular case, no harm could reasonably be expected to result,
and there was simply no negligence. These same courts, in other cases, have
upheld liability without privity for objects normally very innocuous.2 0 There
Aircraft Corp., 183 F.2d 479 (10th Cir. 1950); Fish v. Kirlin-Gray Elec. Co., 18 S.D. 122,
99 N.W. 1092 (1904) ; Williams v. Charles Stores Co., 209 N.C. 591, 184 S.E. 496 (1936).
22. Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 166 F.2d 908 (3d Cir. 1948) ; Hale
v. Depaoli, 33 Cal. 2d 228, 201 P.2d 1 (1948) ; Hunter v. Quality Homes, Inc., 45 Del. (6
Terry) 100, 68 A.2d 620 (Del. 1949); Colton v. Foulkes, 259 Wis. 142, 47 N.W.2d 901
(1951) ; Colbert v. Holland Furnace Co., 333 Ill. 78, 164 N.E. 162 (1928) ; Wright v. Hol-
land Furnace Co., 186 Minn. 265, 243 N.W. 387 (1932); McDonnell v. Wasenmiller, 74
F.2d 320 (8th Cir. 1934).
23. Gratuitous lenders, bailors and donors are, however, still held to have no duty
of inspection before delivery of the chattel, and are liable only for a failure to disclose
defects of which they have knowledge, which may make it dangerous to third persons.
Gagnon v. Dana, 69 N.H. 264, 39 Atl. 982 (1898) ; Johnson v. H. M. Bullard Co., 95 Conn.
251, 111 Atl. 70 (1920) ; The Pegeen, 14 F. Supp. 748 (S.D. Cal. 1936) ; Davis v. Sander-
man, 225 Iowa 1001, 282 N.W. 717 (1938); Ruth v. Hutchinson Gas Co., 209 Minn. 248,
296 N.W. 136 (1941); Nelson v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 20 N.J. Super. 198, 89 A.2d 445
(App. Div. 1952).
24. Field v. Empire Case Goods Co., 179 App. Div. 253, 166 N.Y. Supp. 509 (1917)
(bed) ; Jaroniec v. C. 0. Hasselbarth, Inc., 223 App. Div. 182, 228 N.Y. Supp. 302 (1928)
(bed) ; Timpson v. Marshall, Meadows & Stewart, Inc., 198 Misc. 1034, 101 N.Y.S.2d
583 (Sup. Ct. 1950) (shoes) ; Liedeker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 249 App. Div. 835, 292
N.Y. Supp. 541 (1937) (beach chair); Boyd v. American Can Co., 249 App. Div. 644,
291 N.Y. Supp. 205 (1936), aff'd per curians, 274 N.Y. 526, 10 N.E.2d 532 (1937) (can
with key) ; Block v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 162 Misc. 325, 296 N.Y. Supp. 922
(Sup. Ct. 1937) (per curiam) (cigarette).
25. Poplar v. Bourjois, Inc., 272 App. Div. 74, 69 N.Y.S.2d 252 (1947), afJ'd, 293
N.Y. 62, 80 N.E.2d 334 (1948) (cosmetic container: Maryland law) ; Osheroff v. Rhodes-
Burford Co., 203 Ky. 408, 262 S.W. 583 (1924) (hook of a swing); Davis v. Glass
Coffee Brewer Corp., 236 Ky. 706, '178 S.W.2d 407 (1944) (coffee percolator) ; Robbins
v. Georgia Power Co., 47 Ga. App. 517, 171 S.E. 218 (1933) (vibrator); Schindley v.
Allen-Sherman-Hoff Co., 157 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1946) (gate stop: Ohio law) ; Blissen-
bach v. Yanko, 90 Ohio App. 557, 107 N.E.2d 409 (1951) (vaporizer); Defore v. Bour-
jois, Inc., 268 Ala. 211, 105 So. 2d 846 (1958) (perfume bottle).
26. Hoenig v. Central Stamping Co., 273 N.Y. 485, 6 N.E.2d 415 (1936) (per curiam)
(coffee urn) ; Meditz v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 167 Misc. 176, 3 N.Y.S.2d 357
(N.Y.C. City Ct. 1938) (cigarette) ; Workstel v. Stern Bros., 3 Misc. 2d 858, 156 N.Y.S.2d
335 (Sup. Ct. 1956) (bed) ; La Frumento v. Kotex Co., 131 Misc. 314, 226 N.Y. Supp. 750
(N.Y.C. City Ct. 1928) (sanitary napkin); White Sewing Mach. Co. v. Felsel, 28 Ohio
App. 152, 162 N.E. 633 (1927) (sewing machine); Simmons Co. v. Hardin, 75 Ga. App.
420, 43 S.E.2d 553 (1947) (sofa) ; cf. Matthews v. Lawnlite Co., 88 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1956)
(lounge chair).
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is, in addition, still a refusal on the part of a few courts to allow recovery
for pecuniary loss to the consumer caused by .the defects in the product itself,
such as the cost of repairing it when it breaks down.-7 This very evidently
results from a reluctance, not to find liability for negligence, but to extend
it to the protection of such purely economic interests.2 Apart from these
few cases, no one now seriously disputes the broad general rule that the seller
of a chattel is always liable for his negligence.
At a comparatively early stage of the battle over negligence, and while it
was still hanging in the balance, the assault began upon another wing, against
the fortress of strict liability. In the beginning it iwas directed against a
narrow segment of the wall, defended only by the sellers of food and drink.
FOOD AND DRINK
The purveyor of victuals for human consumption always has been held to
a special responsibility under the common law. Even in the ancient days of
the courts of custom, manor and baron, leet and tolsey and pie-powder, there
were innumerable local regulations governing weight and measure and qual-
ity. The baker of bad bread went to the pillory, and the ale-wife who sold
sorry beer "journeyed to the tumbrel with distaff and spindle.'" - The year
1266 saw the first of a series of English criminal statutes imposing penalties
upon victualers, vintners, brewers, butchers, cooks, and others who marketed
"corrupt" food and drink for immediate consumption. Although these statutes
said nothing about civil liability, it was recognized that "by the common
custom of the realm" there was a general principle that those who failed to
show the degree of skill prevailing in their trade were subject to liability
in an action on the case. °
27. Trans-Wrorld Airlines, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 1 Misc. 2d 477, 148 N.Y.S.2d
284 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Wyatt v. Cadillac Motor Car Div., 145 Cal. App. 2d 423, 302 P2d
665 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956) ; A. J. P. Contracting Corp. v. Brooklyn Builders Supply Co.,
171 Misc. 157, 1.1 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1939), aff'd mere., 258 App. Div. 747, 15 N.Y.S2d 424
(1939), aff'd per curiam, 283 N.Y. 692, 28 N.E2d 412 (1940); Lucette Originals, Inc.
v. General Cotton Converters, Inc., 8 App. Div. 2d 102, 185 N.Y.S2d 8S4 (1959).
Where there is physical damage to the chattel itself, as where an automobile is wrecked
because of its bad brakes, recovery is allowed. Quackenbush v. Ford Motor Co., 167
App. Div. 433, 153 N.Y. Supp. 131 (1915) ; International Harvester Co. v. Sharoff, 202
F2d 52 (10th Cir. 1953) ; C. D. Herme, Inc. v. 1. C. Tway Co., 294 S.V2d 534 (Ky.
1956) ; Fentress v. Van Etta Motors, 157 Cal. App. 2d 863, 323 P2d 227 (Super. Ct.. App.
Dep't 1958). The last named case overrules Judson Pacific-Murphy Inc. v. Thew Shovel
Co., 127 Cal. App. 2d 828, 275 P2d 841 (Super. CL, App. Dep't 1954), where a crane was
used for the "entirely laudable work of raising steel for the building of the Hastings
College of Law."
28. Cf. Karl's Shoe Stores v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 145 F. Supp. 376 (D. ,Mass.
1956) (denying recovery to a retailer for his pecuniary loss). See generally Seavey,
Actions for Economic Harm--A Comment, 32 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 1242 (1957).
29. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE LJ. 1133, 1143 (1931).
30. mELICK, THE SALE OF FOOD AND DanxK 1, 7 (1936).
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Beginning about 1431, there were dicta in a line of decisions,3 ' and occasional
statements of text writers,32 to the effect that the seller of food incurred a
strict liability, in the nature of an implied warranty. After the ancient statutes
had been repealed in 1844,33 Baron Parke said by way of dictum in Burnby
v. Bollett,3 4 where one farmer sold a pig to another, that sellers of corrupt
victuals were responsible civilly to those to whom they sold them, "certainly
if they do so knowingly, and probably if they do not." There has been some
difference of opinion as to whether all of this adds up to a special common-law
warranty peculiar to food.3 5 Some kind of special responsibility there tn-
doubtedly was; and whether it was to be called "warranty" is perhaps of
little consequence today.3, The early American decisions thought that "war-
ranty" was the name for it, and imposed strict liability upon the seller of food,
in favor of his purchaser, as "a principle, not only salutary, but necessary
to the preservation of health and life."81
All of this involved only direct sales to the injured consumer. The ex-
tension of the strict liability to third persons with whom the seller had made
no contract came after the turn of the century. It was the aftermath of a
prolonged and violent national agitation over defective food,88 which at times
31. Y.B. 9 Hen. VI, f. 53B, pl. 37 (1431); Y.B. 11 Edw. IV, f. 6B, pl. 10; Keilwey
91 note, 72 Eng. Rep. 254 note (K.B. 1507); Roswel v. Vaughan, Cro. Jac. 196, 79 Eng.
Rep. 171 (Exch. 1607).
32. Haley, annot., in FiTz-HERBERT, NATURA BREvnUM 94 (9th ed. 1794); 3 BL.
Coai. 165 (1765); see 3 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 386 (4th ed. 1936),
33. 7 & 8 Vict., 1849, c. 24.
34. 16 M. & W. 644, 654, 153 Eng. Rep. 1348, 1352 (Exch. 1847).
35. MELIcK, THE SALE OF FOOD AND DRINK 10 (1936), concludes that there was an
implied warranty. Perkins, Unwholeome Food as a Source of Liability, 5 IOWA L. BULL.
6,8-9 (1919), considers that there was not, relying in the main upon Emmerton v. Mathews,
7 H. & N. 586, 158 Eng. Rep. 604 (1862), and Smith v. Baker, 40 L.T.R. (n.s.) 261
(1878), where, however, the sale was to a dealer and not to a consumer.
36. Some kind of special civil responsibility undoubtedly attached to retail food
sales long before the modern warranties expressed by the sales statutes were de-
veloped, and this responsibility ultimately came to be classed as a 'warranty' obli-
gation. But whether it presupposed scienter, and whether it was simply absorbed
into the warranties of fitness and merchantability, atrophied from disuse, died with
the repeal of the ancient food statutes in 1844, or survived in legal potentiality
until snuffed out [by the English Sale of Goods Act] in 1894, we cannot be sure.
DICKERSON, PRODucrs LIABILITY AND THE FOOD CoNsumER 26 (1951).
37. Van Bracklin v. Fonda, 12 Johns. 468, 7 Am. Dec. 339 (N.Y. 1815) ; Moses v.
Mead, 1 Denio 378, 387, 43 Am. Dec. 676 (N.Y. 1845); Race v. Krum, 222 N.Y. 410,
118 N.E. 853 (1918). See Heinemann v. Barfield, 136 Ark. 500, 502, 207 S.W. 62 (1918);
Hoover v. Peters, 18 Mich. 51, 55 (1869) ; Bark v. Dixson, 115 Minn. 172, 131 N.W. 1078
(1911) (master-servant) ; McNaughton v. Joy, 1 W.N.C. 470 (Pa. 1875) ; Flessher v.
Carstens Packing Co., 93 Wash. 48, 54, 160 Pac. 14, 17 (1916) ; Jones v. Murray, 3 T.B.
Mon. 83, 85 (Ky. 1825) ; Osgood v. Lewis, 2 Harr. & G. 495, 519 (Md. 1829) ; Bragg
v. Morrill, 49 Vt. 45, 24 Am. Rep. 102, 103 (1876) (dictum); Williams v. Slaughter,
3 Wis. 347, 360 (1854) (dictum).
38. Narrated in Regier, The Struggle for Pederal Food and Drugs Legislation, I
LAW & CoNTEmp. PROB. 3 (1933).
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almost reached a pitch of hysteria. This was the age of the "muckrakerb,"
who uncovered and revealed to a dismayed public the fact that a major part
of the food which it consumed daily was adulterated and preserved with poison-
ous chemicals, 39 or was unsanitary and dangerously unsafe. Dr. Harvey W.
Wiley, Chief Chemist of the Department of Agriculture, and his "poiun
squad," contributed wholesale proof. The meat industry came under particular
attack; and a sensational novel, The Jungle, by Upton Sinclair, depicted con-
ditions in the Chicago packing houses as filthy, slimy, revolting and horrible
beyond belief. They were in all conscience bad enough, but the portrayal
in this novel strains credulity today.40 It was the best selling book of the
39. Scores of articles appeared in 1905 and 1906 which dealt with the patent medicine
evil and the adulteration of food. Even Senator McCumber of North Dakota had
an article in the Independent which was entitled "The Alarming Adulteratitn ui
Food and Drugs." In it he presented many facts which Professor E. F. Ladd, the
Food Commissioner of his own state, had discovered. Ladd had never yet found
a can of potted chicken or potted turkey in North Dakota which contained chicken
or turkey in determinable quantities. Of the local markets of his state, ninety per
cent used chemical preservatives. The amount of borax or boracic acid which %,as
used in sausages and hamburger steak ranged from twenty to forty-five grains
per pound though the daily medical dose --as only from five to nine grains ....
Boracic acid or borates were common ingredients of dried beef, smoked meats,
canned bacon, and canned chipped beef. Ninety per cent of the so-called French
peas were found to contain copper salts, and some contained aluminum salts in
addition. Only one kind of catsup was free from chemical preservatives and coal
tar coloring matters. About seventy per cent of cocoas and chocolates were adulter-
ated, and glucose served a great variety of purposes. More than ten times the amount
of Vermont maple syrup was sold every year than the state could produce. A large
proportion of ground spices were imitations. Jellies, wines, and other liquors were
made from cheap substances and then doctored up. Butter was a mi.ture of butter
and deodorized lard. Ice cream contained no cream, only condensed milk and neutral
lard. Cider vinegar usually contained no apple juice. Drugs were adulterated and mis-
branded in a similar fashion, often with deplorable consequences.
Id. at 7-8.
40. After rereading The Jungle, the writer cannot refrain from expressing his opiniun
as to how bad a piece of literature it is. As to style, characterization, plot, incident,
dialogue, everything, in short, beyond the subject with which it deals, the book is trash.
Mr. Dooley's description is a fair one:
A young fellow wrote a book. Th' divvle take him fr writin' it. Hogan says
it's a grand book. It's wan iv th' gr-reatest books he iver r-read. It almost made
him commit suicide. Th' hero is a Lithuanian, or as ye might say, Pollacky, who
left th' barb'rous land iv his birth an' come to this home iv opporchunity where ivry
man is th' equal iv ivry other man befure th' law if he isn't careful. Our hero got
a fancy job poling food products out iv a catchbasin, an' mas promoted to scrapin'
pure leaf-lard off .th' flure iv th' glue facthry. But th' binifits iv our gloryous civily-
zation were wasted on this poor peasant Instead iv bein' thankful fr what he got,
an' lookin' forward to a day whin his opporchunity wud arrive an', be merely stubbin'
his toe, he might become rich an' famous as a pop'lar soup, he grew cross an'
unruly, bit his boss, an' was sint to jail. But it all tur-rned out well in th' end.
Th' villain fell into a lard-tank an' was not seen again ontil he tur-rned up at a
fash'nable resthrant in New York. Our hero got out iv jail an' was revarded with
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year, was translated into seventeen languages, and by 1922 had sold 150,000
copies. Intended as a piece of propaganda for socialism, The Jungle succeeded
in becoming instead a minor Uncle Tom's Cabin of the war against bad food.
The author said later that he had aimed at the public's heart, and by accident
hit it in the stomach.4t
The upshot of the agitation was the Federal Food and Drug Act of 1906,
which closed interstate commerce to misbranded and adulterated food and
drugs. It was preceded and followed by numerous state food and drug acts,
many of them with more teeth than the federal law. Hard upon the heels
of all this came the political overturn of 1912, when conservative politicians
went down to defeat all along the line across the country, and a new crop of
legislators, as well as many new judges, took office with the philosophy that
the public must be protected against "big business." The time and public
sentiment were ripe for a change in the law of food liability.
The state of Washington 42 led off in 1913, to be followed within the year
by Kansas 43 and Mississippi.44 None of the three decisions gave much in
the way of reasons for the strict liability to the consumer without privity,
other than the protection of the public interest, and an "implied representation"
that the food was safe. As other jurisdictions followed suit, and the cases
began to multiply, there was a period in the twenties in which the courts
labored hard to evolve a great many highly ingenious theories 45 to justify
the rule, such as fictitious agencies or third-party-beneficiary contracts. In
1927 the Mississippi court 40 came up with the idea of a "warranty" running
with the goods from the manufacturer to the consumer, by analogy to a coven-
ant running with the land. This found general, although perhaps undeserved,
acceptance, and nearly all of the later cases have adopted some theory of
Ccwarranty."
a pleasant position as a porter iv an arnychist hotel, an' all ended merry as a fun'ral
bell.
DUNNE, M .DooLFv: Now AND FoREvER 236 (Academic Reprints, Stanford, Cal. 1954).
41. Regier, The Struggle for Federal Food and Drugs Legislation, 1 LAW & CoNrTEM..
PRoB. 3, 8 (1933).
42. Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913).
43. Parks v. C. C. Yost Pie Co., 93 Kan. 334, 144 Pac. 202 (1914).
44. Jackson Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Chapman, 106 Miss. 864, 869, 64 So. 791 (1914):
A 'sma' mousie' caused the trouble in this case. The 'wee, sleekit, cow'rin', tim'rous
beastie' drowned in a bottle of coca-cola .... [The consumer] did not get joy from
the anticipated refreshing drink. He was in the frame of mind to approve the poet's
words:
'The best-laid schemes o' mice an' men
Gang aft aglay
An' lea'e us nought but grief an' pain,
For promisd joy I'
Id. at 869, 64 So. at 791.
45. See text at notes 144-46 infra.
46. Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927).
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The gradual process of acceptance of the strict liability rule in food cases
continued, and in recent years has accelerated. As of the present writing,
there are seventeen jurisdictions which apply it. They are Arizona,4? Cali-
fornia,48 Florida,49 Illinoisr 0 Iowa,51 Kansas,52 LouisianaO Michigan,"
Mississippi, 55 Missouri,56 Ohio 7 Oklahoma, 58 Pennsylvania,90 Puerto Rico,c"
47. Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cathey, 83 Ariz. 163, 317 P.2d 1094 (1957) ; see
Eisenbeiss v. Payne, 42 Ariz. 262, 25 P2d 162 (1933).
48. Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P2d 799 (1939); Vaccarezza
v. Sanguinetti, 71 Cal. App. 2d 687, 163 P2d 470 (Dist. Ct. App. 1945); Medeiros v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 57 Cal. App. 2d 707, 135 P.2d 676 (Dist. Ct. App. 1943).
49. Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co., 154 Fla. 872, 19 So. 2d 313 (1944) ; Florida Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 62 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 1953) ; see Parkinson & Sanders, Implied
Warranty in Florida, 12 U. FA. L. REV. 241 (1959).
50. Patargias v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 332 111. App. 117, 74 N.E2d 162 (1947);
Blarieske v. Thompson's Restaurant Co., 325 Ill. App. 189, 59 N.E.2d 320 (1945) ; Welter
v. Bowman Dairy Co., 318 Ill. App. 305, 47 N.E.2d 739 (1943); Williams v. Paducah
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 343 Ill. App. 1, 98 N.E.2d 164 (1931) (dictum); Heimsoth v.
Falstaff Brewing Corp., 1 Ill. App. 2d 28, 116 N.E.2d 193 (1933).
51. Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382 (1920); Anderson
v. Tyler, 223 Iowa 1033, 274 N.AV. 48 (1937).
52. Parks v. C. C. Yost Pie Co., 93 Kan. 334, 144 Pac. 202 (1914); Challis v. Hartloff,
136 Kan. 823, 18 P.2d 199 (1933); Swengel v. F. & I. Wholesale Grocery Co., 147 Kan.
555, 77 P.2d 930 (1938); Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P2d 317 (1953); Simmons
v. Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 181 Kan. 35, 309 P2d 633 (1957) ; Cernes v. Pittsburg
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 183 Kan. 758, 332 P.2d 2558 (1958).
53. Le Blanc v. Louisiana Coca Cola Bottling Co., 221 La. 919, 60 So. 2d 873 (1952);
Miller v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 70 So. 2d 409 (La. Ct. App. 1954).
54. Michigan has for years talked of a "warranty" running with the product to the
consumer, but has defined it to mean only a warranty that due care has been used. Hertzler
v. Manshum, 228 Mich. 416, 200 N.W. 155 (1924) ; Smolenski v. Libby, McNeill & Libby,
280 Mich. 329, 273 N.W. 587 (1937); Ebers v. General Chem. Co., 310 Mich. 261, 17
N.W.2d 176 (1945). In the recent case of Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry
Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958), the court found a "warranty" from
the maker- of cinder building blocks-and apparently of other products, including food-
to the consumer, even in the absence of negligence.
55. Jackson Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Chapman, 106 Miss. 864, 64 So. 791 (1914);
Rainwater v. Hattiesburg Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 131 Miss. 315, 95 So. 444 (1923);
Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927); Chenault v.
Houston Coca Cola Bottling Co., 151 Miss. 366, 118 So. 177 (1928) ; Coca Cola Bottling
Works v. Simpson, 158 Miss. 390, 130 So. 479 (1930) ; Bufkin v. Grisham, 157 Miss. 746
128 So. 563 (1930); Curtiss Candy Co. v. Johnson, 163 Miss. 426, 141 So. 762 (1932);
Biedenharn Candy Co. v. Moore, 184 Miss. 721, 186 So. 628 (1939).
56. Madouros v. Kansas City Coca Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 90 S.W2d
445 (1936); Nemela v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 104 S.W.2d 773 (Mo. Ct. App. 1937);
McNicholas v. Continental Baking Co., 112 S.W.2d 849 (Mo. Ct App. 1938) ; Carter v.
St Louis Dairy Co., 139 S.W2d 1025 (Mo. Ct App. 1940) ; Helms v. General Baking Co.,
164 S.W2d 150 (Mo. Ct. App. 1942); Foley v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 215 S.W.2d 314
(Mo. Ct App. 1948).
57. Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928) ; Tennebaum
v. Pendergast, 90 N.E.2d 453 (Ohio C.P. 1949); Mahoney v. Shaker Square Beverages,
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Texas,6 1 Virginia,62 and Washington.6 3 In five other states, Connecticut,"
Georgia,65 Minnesota, 66 Montana,67 and South Carolina, 8 the same result
is reached under statutes, which either provide a warranty to the consumer,
or are construed to make the sale of defective food for human consumption
negligence per se, even though there is no privity and all possible care has
been used. There are thus twenty-two in all.
Fourteen jurisdictions have rejected the strict liability, and continue to
hold that the seller of food is not liable to the consumer in the absence of
negligence or privity of contract. They are Alabama,6 9 Arkansas, 70 the Dis-
Inc., 102 N.E.2d 281 (Ohio C.P. 1951). Ohio has carried the rule beyond food. See notes
100-01 infra.
58. Griffin v. Asbury, 196 Okla. 484, 165 P.2d 822 (1945) ; see Southwest Ice & Dairy
Prod. Co. v. Faulkenberry, 203 Okla. 279, 220 P.2d 257 (1950).
59. At first Pennsylvania relied on a pure food statute, regarded as declaratory of the
common law. Catani v. Swift & Co., 251 Pa. 52, 95 AtI. 931 (1915) ; Nock v. Coca Cola
Bottling Works, 102 Pa. Super. 515, 156 Atl. 537 (1931). Later cases have ceased to rely
on it. Bilk v. Abbotts Dairies, Inc., 147 Pa. Super. 39, 23 A.2d 342 (1941); Caskie v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 373 Pa. 614, 96 A.2d 901 (1953) ; see Bonker v. Ingersoll Prod.
Corp., 132 F. Supp. 5 (D. Mass. 1955) (Pennsylvania law).
60. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Negron Torres, 255 F2d 149 (1st Cir. 1958); Poice
de Leon v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 75 F. Supp. 966 (D.P.RL 1948).
61. Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W2d 828 (1942); Griggs
Canning Co. v. Josey, 139 Tex. 623, 164 S.W.2d 835 (1942); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v.
Smith, 97 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1936) ; Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Burgess, 195
S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1946); Amarillo Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Loudder,
207 S.W2d 632 (Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1947) ; Sweeney v. Cain, 243 S.W,2d 874 (Tex. Civ.
Ct. App. 1951) ; Campbell Soup Co. v. Ryan, 328 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1959).
62. Swift & Co. v. Wells, 110 S.E.2d 203 (Va. 1959).
63. Nelson v. West Coast Dairy Co., 5 Wash. 2d 284, 105 P2d 76 (1940); Geisness
v. Scow Bay Packing Co., 16 Wash. 2d 1, 132 P.2d 740 (1942) (dictum); LaHue v. Coca
Cola Bottling, Inc., 50 Wash. 2d 645, 314 P.2d 421 (1957) ; see Mazetti v. Armour & Co.,
75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913).
64. CONN. GaN. STAT. § 42-16 (1958) (A warranty to "all persons for whom such food
or drink is intended").
65. Criswell Baking Co. v. Milligan, 77 Ga. App. 861, 50 S.E.2d 136 (1948); Donaldson
v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 186 Ga. 870, 199 S.E. 213 (1938).
66. Meshbesher v. Channellene Oil & Mfg. Co., 107 Minn. 104, 119 N.W. 428 (1909).
67. Bolitho v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 109 Mont. 213, 95 P2d 443 (1939).
68. Culbertson v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 157 S.C. 352, 154 S.E. 424 (1930) : Hollis
v. Armour & Co., 190 S.C. 170, 2 S.E.2d 681 (1939); McKenzie v. Peoples Baking Co.,
205 S.C. 149, 31 S.E.2d 154 (1944) ; Turner v. Wilson, 227 S.C. 95, 86 S.E.2d 867 (1955).
The Ohio statute has been given a similar effect. Drock v. Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co.,
61 Ohio App. 291, 22 N.E.2d 547 (1939) ; Troietto v. G. H. Hammond Co., 110 F.2d 135
(6th Cir. 1940); Hunter v. Derby Foods, Inc., 110 F2d 970 (2d Cir. 1940). The Ohio
courts have, however, in the main ceased to rely upon it, and have adopted instead the theory
of a warranty running with the food.
69. Birmingham Chero-Cola Bottling Co. v. Clark, 205 Ala. 678, 89 So. 64 (1921);
cf. Sterchi Bros. Stores, Inc. v. Castleberry, 28 Ala. App. 281, 182 So. 471 (1938) (sale
of refrigerator). Cases in the intermediate courts have accepted strict liability, but ap-
parently are not the present law. Alabama Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Ezzell, 22 Ala. App.
1108 [Vol. 69:1IM9
STRICT LIABILITY TO THE CONSUMER
trict of Columbia,71 Kentucky,72 Maine, 73 Iaryland,74 Massachusetts," New
Hampshire,7 6 New Jersey,77 New York,78 Rhode Island," South Dakota,"
Tennessee,"' and Wisconsin. 2 There are two others, North Carolina 8 and
210, 114 So. 278 (1927); cf. Dothan Chero-Cola Bottling Co. v. Weeks, D1o Ala. App.
639, 80 So. 734 (1918) (privity not required for action on warranty of due care).
70. Drury v. Armour & Co., 140 Ark. 371, 216 S.W. 40 (1919) ; Nelson v. Armour
Packing Co., 76 Ark. 352, 90 SV. 288 (1905) ; Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Guilliams, 189
Ark. 1037, 76 S.W.2d 65 (1934).
71. Connecticut Pie Co. v. Lynch, 61 App. D.C. 81, 57 F.2d 447 (Ct. App. 1932);
Hanback v. Dutch Baker Boy, Inc., 70 App. D.C. 398, 107 F.2d 203 (1939).
72. Nehi Bottling Co. v. Thomas, 236 Ky. 684, 33 SAV.2d 701 (1930).
73. Pelletier v. Dupont, 124 ie. 269, 128 Ati. 186 (1925).
74. Flaccomio v. Eysink, 129 Md. 367, 100 Adt. 510 (1916); Vaccarino V. CozzubW, IM
Md. 614, 31 A2d 316 (1943); Cloverland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Ellin, 195 Md. t03, 75
A.2d 116 (1950) ; Bryer v. Rath Packing Co., 221 MCd. 105, 156 A.2d 442 (1959): Atvell
v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 152 A.2d 196 (Mun. App. D.C. 1959) (Maryland law).
75. Gearing v. Berkson, 223 Mass. 257, 111 N.E. 785 (1916) ; Newball v. Ward Baking
Co., 240 Mass. 434, 134 N.E. 625 (1922); Carlson v. Turner Centre System, 203 Mas.
339, 161 N.E. 245 (1928) ; Kennedy v. Brockelman Bros., 334 Mass. 225, 134 N.E.2d 747
(1956) ; Karger v. Armour & Co., 17 F. Supp. 484 (D. Mass. 1936).
76. Howson v. Foster Beef Co., 87 N.H. 200, 177 At. 656 (1935) ; Hazelton v. First
Nat'l Stores, Inc., 88 N.H. 409, 190 At. 280 (1937) ; Smith v. Salem Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 92 N.H. 97, 25 A.2d 125 (1942) ; Russell v. First Nat'l Stores, Inc., 96 N.H. 471,
79A2d 573 (1951).
77. Cassini v. Curtis Candy Co., 113 NJ.L. 91, 172 AUt. 519 (Sup. Ct 1934) ; Brussels.
v. Grand Union Co., 14 N.J. Misc. 751, 187 At. 582 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Cornelius v. B.
Filippone & Co., 119 N.J.L. 540, 197 At. 647 (Sup. Ct. 1938) ; Stave v. Giant Food Arcade,
125 N.J.L. 512, 16 A.2d 460 (Sup. Ct 1940) ; Schlosser v. Goldberg, 12 NJ.L. 470, 9
A.2d 699 (Sup. Ct. 1939) ; Duncan v. Jurnan, 25 NJ. Super. 330, 96 A2d 415 (App. Div.
1953).
78. Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 235 N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576 (1923); Redmund v.
Borden's Farm Prods. Co., 245 N.Y. 512, 157 N.E. 838 (1927); Gimenez v. Great Ad. &
Pac. Tea Co., 264 N.Y. 390, 191 N.E. 27 (1934); Bourchei-x v. Willow Brouk Dairy,
Inc., 268 N.Y. 1, 196 N.E. 617 (1935). There are at least a dozen other cases in the inieriur
New York courts. See Note, 8 BuriAwO L. REV. 290 (1959).
Recently some of the lower courts have been trying to change the rule and apply strict
liability. Welch v. Schiebelhuth, 11 Misc. 2d 312, 169 N.Y.S2d 309 (Sup. Ct. 1957);
Parish v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 13 Misc. 2d 33, 177 N.Y.S2d 7 (Munic. Ct. 1953),
Lardaro v. 'MBS Cigar Corp., 10 Misc. 2d 873, 177 N.Y.S.2d 6 (N.Y.C. Munic. CL 1957);
Greenberg v. Lorenz, 12 Misc. 2d 883, 178 N.Y.S2d 407 (App. Term 1958), rc/d 183
N.Y.S.2d 46 (App. Div. 1959).
79. Minutilla v. Providence Ice Cream Co., 50 R.I. 43, 144 Ad. 884 (1929); Lombardi
v. California Packing Sales Corp., 83 R-I. 51, 112 A.2d 701 (1955).
80. Whitethorn v. Nash-Finch Co., 67 S.D. 465, 293 N.W. 859 (1940).
81. Crigger v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 132 Tenn. 545, 179 S.W. 155 (1915); Coca-Cola
Bottling Works -. Sullivan, 178 Tenn. 405, 158 S.W.2d 721 (1942).
82. Prinsen v. Russos, 194 Wis. 142, 215 N.V. 905 (1927); see Cohan v. Assodated
Fur Farms, Inc., 261 Wis. 584, 53 N.W.2d 788 (1952) (animal food).
83. After an initial dictum approving strict liability in Ward v. Morehead City Sea
Food Co., 171 N.C. 33, 87 S.E. 958 (1916), the court rejected it in Thomason v.
Ballard & Ballard Co., 208 N.C. 1, 179 S.E. 30 (1935); Enloe v. Charlotte C-,ca-Cola
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West Virgina,8 4 which probably are still to be listed as rejecting the rule,
although they are somewhat doubtful.
In the remaining fourteen states, Alaska, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii,
Idaho, Indiana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, Utah, Vermont
and Wyoming, there appears to be no definite law. In many of them there
are decisions 85 stating, as to other products, the general rule that a warranty
does not extend beyond the person with whom the seller makes his contract;
but there has been no consideration of whether there may or may not be a
special and exceptional rule as to food.
Thus it appears 'that strict liability in food cases, without privity, is the
present law of a clear majority of the jurisdictions which have any definite
law. Surprising as this may be to those who have not followed the changes
of the last few years, it becomes even more impressive when one looks at
the minority decisions. In most of the jurisdictions which reject the strict
liability the earliest decision came before 1930. No new state has rejected it
since 1935, and since that year ten new ones 'have adopted it. A good many
of the opinions in the minority group have recognized the trend, but have
said that their law is established, and any change must be for the legislature. 80
It needs no seer or soothsayer to conclude that the outer defenses of the
fortress of strict liability are even now in process of being carried; that so
marked a trend will inevitably continue; and that the law of the future is
that of strict liability for food.
BEYOND FOOD
While this battle was still in its inception, and the attackers had as yet
made little progress, writers here and there began to direct their shafts at
other parts of the wall, and to cry for an extension of the strict liability to
products other than food. For a long time the battlements held firm against
all the raiding parties; and until the nineteen fifties no major breach occurred.
The wall is still stoutly defended; and most of the courts which accept strict
liability without privity as to food still refuse to apply it to such things as
Bottling Co., 208 N.C. 305, 180 S.E. 582 (1935) ; and Caudle v. F. M. Bohannon Tobacco
Co., 220 N.C. 105, 16 S.E2d 680 (1941). However, in Davis v. Radford, 233 N.C. 283,
63 S.E.2d 822 (1951), there is dictum which indicates that the court may be ready to
change its position.
84. All that has been found is a dictum requiring privity in Burgess v. Sanitary Meat
Iviarket, 121 W. Va. 605, 5 S.E.2d 785 (1939).
85. Typical are Barni v. Kutner, 45 Del. (6 Terry) 550, 76 A.2d 801 (Super. Ct. 1950)
(used automobile); Wood v. Advance Rumely Thresher Co., 60 N.D. 384, 234 N.W. 517
(1931) (tractor) ; Abercrombie & Union Portland Cement Co., 35 Idaho 231, 205 Pac.
1118 (1922) (cement); Senter v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 127 F. Supp. 705 (D. Colo. 1954)
(express warranty of tire).
It should be mentioned that in Underhill v. Anciaux, 68 Nev. 69, 226 P.2d 794 (1951),
the court apparently would have been willing to consider strict liability for food, but did
not find it necessary to do so.
86. See, e.g., Lombardi v. California Packing Sales Co., 83 RI. 51, 112 A.2d 701
(1955).
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automobiles,8 7 tires, s pumps,89 insecticides, 0 antifreeze compounds,91 electric
blankets,92 insulating materials,9 3 lumber,9 4furnaces,05 or a portable elevator.0
It goes without saying, of course, that where the rule is rejected as to food, it is
rejected as to everything else. Of late, however, there has been here and there
a breach; the assault goes on apace, and as the nineteen sixties are upon us,
it becomes evident that we are to witness a new onslaught, which may lead
to the most desperate struggle of all.
It began harmlessly enough. The first cracks in the wall were small, and
apparently insignificant, when the analogy of food was carried over to some-
thing reasonably resembling it. Thus Missouri 07 and a federal court in Cali-
fornia 9 8 found strict liability, without privity, on the part of a seller of animal
food, apparently on the bald theory that food is food. No breach, however,
in a beleaguered wall is to be ignored. Kansas and Ohio promptly carried
the extension a step further, to articles for intimate bodily use which was
external rather than internal, such as a hair dye,0 9 soap,10 0 and a permanent
87. Fulton Bank v. fathers, 183 Iowa 226, 166 N.W. 1050 (1918) ; Dennis v. Willy:,-
Overland Motors, 111 F. Supp. 875 (W.D. Mo. 1953) ; Murphy v. Plymouth Motor Corp.,
3 Wash. 2d 180, 100 P.2d 30 (1940); Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 327 S.W2d 535 (M1o.
Ct App. 1959) ; Odom v. Ford Motor Co., 230 S.C. 320, 95 S.E.2d 601 (1956) (tractor).
88. Wessley v. Seiberling Rubber Co., 90 F. Supp. 709 (IV.D. Mo. 1950) ; cf. H. M.
Gleason & Co. v. International Harvester Co., 197 Va. 255, 88 S.E2d 904 (1955) (wheel).
89. Jordan v. Worthington Pump & Machinery Co., 73 Ariz. 329, 241 P.2d 433 (1952).
90. Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P2d 1041 (1954); Browvn
v. Howard, 285 S.V2d 752 (Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1955).
91. Cochran v. McDonald, 23 Wash. 348, 161 P.2d 305 (1945) ; Jordon v. Brouwer,
86 Ohio App. 505, 93 N.E2d 49 (1949).
92. Wood v. General Electric Co., 159 Ohio St. 273, 112 N.E_2d 8 (1953) ; cf. Welsh
v. Ledyard, 167 Ohio St. 57, 146 N.E.2d 299 (1957) (electric cooker) ; Steele v. Westing-
house Electric Corp., 107 -Ohio App. 379, 159 N.E.2d 469 (1958) (electric milk cooler) ;
Larson v. United States Rubber Co., 163 F. Supp. 327 (D. Mont. 1958) (rubber boots,
Montana law).
94. Collum v. Pope & Talbot, 135 Cal. App. 2d 653, 288 P.2d 75 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955)
(ceiling joist) ; cf. Alexander v. Inland Steel Co., 263 F2d 314 (10th Cir. 1958) (steel sub-
purlins, Kansas law).
95. Dobbin v. Pacific Coast Coal Co., 25 Wash. 2d 190, 170 P.2d 642 (1946); cf.
Burgess v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 264 F.2d 495 (10th Cir. 1959) (ladder); Booth v.
Scheer, 105 Kan. 643, 185 Pac. 898 (1919) (stallion); Silverman v. Samuel Mallinger
Co., 375 Pa. 422, 100 A.2d 715 (1953) (glass jars).
96. Young v. Aeroil Prod. Co., 248 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1957) (California law).
97. Midwest Game Co. v. M.F.A. Milling Co., 320 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1959) (fish food).
98. McAfee v. Cargill, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Cal. 1954) (dog food). A dictum
in Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co., 63 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1953), would apply the strict liability
to watermelon seed. On the other hand, Mississippi has twice refused to apply it to stock
feed. Pease & Dwyer Co. v. Somers Planting Co., 130 Mliss. 147, 93 So. 673 (1922) ; Royal
Feed & Milling Co. v. Thorn, 142 Miss. 92, 107 So. 282 (1926).
99. Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954).
100. Kruper v. Procter & Gamble Co., 113 N.E2d 605 (Ohio App. 1953), rev'd On
other groundr, 160 Ohio St. 489, 117 N.E2d 7 (1954). A dictum in Worley v. Procter
& Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (1952), apparently would apply
-the strict liability to a detergent on the basis that the user must get it on her hands.
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wave solution.1 1 A federal court in Missouri, reversing its earlier position,
has only lately added a cigarette.'10
A lower court in Ohio 103 was the first to go beyond such articles for bodily
use, and to hold the seller of a grinding wheel strictly liable to the user, without
negligence or privity. The decision apparently was overruled by the supreme
court ;104 but the case which overruled it has since been doubted in turn, with
an intimation that it might be decided otherwise if the question should arise
again.10 5 What the law of Ohio may be at the moment it is difficult to say.
Arkansas 10 0 has found strict liability on the part of the manufacturer of a crop-
dusting compound, dangerous and likely to drift, on the basis of an abnormally
dangerous activity, with a citation of Rylands v. Fletcher. Except to this ex-
tent, however, the prediction of the extension of strict liability to products
of special danger, which has been made from time to time, has not been realized.
The last two years have brought no less than seven spectacular decisions,
which appear to have thrown the limitation to food onto the ash pile, and to
hold that the seller of any product who sells it in a condition dangerous for
use is strictly liable to its ultimate user for injuries resulting from such use,
although the seller has exercised all possible care, and the user has entered
into no contractual relation with him. The first of these, Spence v. Three
Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc.,10 7 came, appropriately enough from
the point of view of the defendant, from the pen of Justice Voelker of Michi-
gan, the author of Anatomy of a Murder; and it imposed the strict liability
upon the manufacturer of cinder building blocks, which by no possible stretch
of the imagination were to be regarded as intended for bodily use, or as "in-
herently dangerous." This was promptly echoed in an intermediate court in
Florida, where the same conclusion was reached as to an electric cable.108 Next
came judge Phillips of the Tenth Circuit,10  purporting to apply the laws of
Kansas and Missouri, but in fact going considerably beyond anything yet
101. Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, 106 Ohio App. 265, 149 N.E.2d 181 (1958),
foreshadowed in Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612
(1958).
102. Ross v. Philip Morris Co., W.D. Mo., Oct. 22, 1959, No. 9494, modilybig the
opinion in 164 F. Supp. 683 (W.D. Mo. 1958). See Anderson, Observations on the Law
of Implied Warranty of Quality in Missouri: 1960, 1960 WASH. U.L.Q. 71.
103. Di Vello v. Gardner Machine Co., 46 Ohio Op. 161, 102 N.E.2d 285 (Ct. App.
1951).
104. Wood v. General Elec. Co., 159 Ohio St. 273, 112 N.E.2d 8 (1953) (electric
blanket).
105. Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
106. Chapman Chem. Co. v. Taylor, 215 Ark. 630, 222 S.W.2d 820 (1949).
107. 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958).
108. Continental Copper & Steel Industries v. E. C. "Red" Cornelius, Inc., 104 So. 2d
40 (Fla. App. 1958).
109. B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959). Compare the
rather casual dictum in Magee v. General Motors, 124 F. Supp. 606 (W.D. Pa. 1954),
a case of an automobile with a defective steering gear: ".... either upon the theory of
breach of implied warranty of fitness for purpose and merchantability, or upon the basis
of common law negligence."
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decided in either state,110 who arrived at the decision that there was strict
liability to the ultimate user on the part of the seller of an automobile tire.
There was then a decision of a Pennsylvania superior court, 1' which seems
rather sadly to have misconstrued the language of earlier cases,1 12 but, how-
ever that may be, concluded that the manufacturer of a truck mwas strictly liable
to the driver. Then came an opinion of an intermediate court in California,lla
almost immediately vacated,11 4 which held the maker of a grinding wheel to
strict liability to an employee of the buyer; and this in turn was accepted, as
the controlling California law on the liability of an airplane manufacturer for
the death of a passenger, by a federal court in New York,11 6 which was ap-
parently blissfully ignorant that it was relying upon a nonexistent opinion.
Finally, there was a decision of the Supreme Court of Minnesota 1 10 in an
express-warranty case, which by way of dictum displayed a desire to jettison
entirely the requirement of privity for any warranty on any product, and seems
to foreshadow strict liability to the consumer for virtually anything sold.
Seven such cases, in so short a time, may very well be said to amount to a
Trend. It would be rather easy to find fault with several of these decisions,
which have displayed much more in the way of enthusiasm for the result to
be reached than of accuracy in the citation of precedent. But taken in the
aggregate, they give the definite impression that the dam has busted, and
those in the path of the avalanche would do well to make for the hills. And
if the metaphor is mixed, it may still not be inappropriate to the situation.
Thus matters now stand. Again it needs no prophet to forsee that there
will be other such decisions in the next few years, and that the storming of
110. See Booth v. Scheer, 105 Kan. 643, 185 Pac. 898 (1919); Dennis v. Willys-
Overland Motors, 111 F. Supp. 875 (W.D. Mo. 1953) ; ,Vessley v. Seiberling Rubber Co.,
90 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Mo. 1950); Ross v. Philip Morris Co., 164 F. Supp. 6S3 (W.D.
Mo. 1958).
In Alexander v. Inland Steel Co., 263 F.2d 314, 319 (10th Cir. 1958), the Tenth Circuit
itself concluded that "implied warranties, in the absence of privity, are restricted in Kansas
to food and beverage products, glass containers of beverages, and hair dye."
111. Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 569 (1959).
112. The court relied on Loch v. Confair, 361 Pa. 158, 63 A.2d 24 (1949), which is a
negligence case, and on three cases of express warranty, Conestoga Cigar Co. v. Finke,
144 Pa. 159, 22 Aft. 868 (1891); Silverman v. Samuel Mallinger Co., 375 Pa. 422, 100
A.2d 715 (1953) ; Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946). None of these
appears to offer any support for the proposition that an implied warranty of a product
other than food runs to one not in privity.
113. Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 343 P2d 261 (Cal. App. 1959).
114. The supreme court of California promptly granted a hearing in this case. Under
the peculiar California procedure such a hearing is de novo. The opinion of the District
Court of Appeals is vacated, and becomes as if never written. It is not officially reported,
and in California it is considered a breach of etiquette for counsel even to refer to it.
At the time of writing the hearing is still pending.
115. Ilinton v. Republic Aviation Corp., 180 F. Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). Since the
text was written, this has been echoed in Middleton v. United Aircraft Corp., 6 Av. Cas.
17957 (S.D.N.Y. 1.960).
116. Beck v. Spindler, 99 N.W.2d 670 (Minn. 1959).
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the inner citadel is already in full cry. That there may also be legislation
is indicated by a Georgia statute,"" enacted in 1957, which provides that every
manufacturer of any product sold as new shall warrant to the ultimate con-
sumer that the article sold is merchantable and fit for the purpose.
Over this stricken field the slings and arrows of outrageous argument con-
tinue to fly.
THE ARGUMENTS
One may well ask at the outset, why is not liability for negligence enough?
Why do the plaintiffs want strict liability; and have they any valid claim to it?
Where the action is against the manufacturer of the product, an honest
estimate might very well be that there is not one case in a hundred in which
strict liability would result in recovery -where negligence does not. When
a negligence action is brought against a manufacturer, the plaintiff is faced
with two initial tasks. One is to prove that his injury has been caused by
a defect in the product. The other is to prove that the defect existed when
the product left the hands of the defendant. For neither of these is strict
liability of any aid to him whatever. It cannot prove the causation ;""8 and
it cannot trace that cause to the defendant." 09 Once over these two hurdles,
the plaintiff 'has a third task, to prove that the defect was there because of
the defendant's negligence. This is by far the easiest of the three, and it is
one in which the plaintiff almost never fails.
It is true that he has the burden of proof on the issue of negligence. It is
true also that 'he seldom, if ever, has any direct evidence of what went on in
the defendant's plant. But in every jurisdiction, he is aided by the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur,120 or by its practical equivalent.' 2' In all jurisdictions
117. GA. CODE ANx. § 96-307, discussed in Patterson, Manufacturcr's Statutory War-
ranty: Tort or Contract? 10 MERcER L. Rav. 272 (1959). The statute was held constitu-
tional in Bookholt v. General Motors Corp., 215 Ga. 391, 110 S.E. 2d 642 (1959).
118. Geisness v. Scow Bay Packing Co., 16 Wash. 2d 1, 132 P.2d 740 (1942).
119. Williams v. Paducah Coca Cola Bottling Co., 343 Ill. App. 1, 98 N.E.2d 164
(1951) ; Tiffin v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 20 Ill. App. 2d 421, 156 N.E.2d 249 (1959);
Sharpe v. Danville Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 9 Il1. App. 2d 175, 132 N.E2d 442 (1956):
Kruper v. Procter & Gamble Co., 160 Ohio St. 489, 117 N.E2d 7 (1954), reversing 113
N.E.2d 605 (Ohio App. 1953); Cudahy Packing Co. v. Baskin, 170 Miss. 834, 155 So,
217 (1934).
120. Cases are legion. See for example Richenbacher v. California Packing Corp.,
250 Mass. 198, 145 N.E. 281 (1924); Dryden v. Continental Bakdng Co., 11 Cal. 2d 33,
77 P2d 833 (1938) ; Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Creech, 245 Ky. 414, 53 S.W.2d 745 (1932) :
Cassini v. Curtis Candy Co., 113 N.J.L. 91, 172 AtI. 519 (Sup. Ct. 1934) ; Gross v. Loft,
Inc., 121 Conn. 394, 185 Atl. 80 (1936) ; Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co., 33 Cal. 2d 51,1,
203 P.2d 522 (1949) ; De Lape v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 25 F. Supp. 1006 (D. Cal.
1939), aff'd, Liggett & Myers Tobacco -Co. v. De Lape, 109 iF.2d 598, (9th Cir. 1940) ;
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Davidson, 193 Ark. 825, 102 S.W.2d 833 (1937) ; Pillars v. R. J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 117 Miss. 490, 78 So. 365 (1918) ; Quinn v. Swift & Co., 20 F. Supp.
234 (M.D. Pa. 1937) ; Bissonnette v. National Biscuit Co., 100 F.2 1003 (2d Cir. 1939);
De Groat v. Ward Baking Co., 102 N.J.L. 188, 130 Ati. 540 (Ct. Err. & App. 1925).
121. Pennsylvania has a doctrine of "exclusive control," which has the same effect.
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this at least gives rise to a permissible inference of the defendant's negligence,
which gets the plaintiff to the jury. And in cases against manufacturers, once
the cause of the harm is laid at their doorstep, a jury verdict for the defendant
on the negligence issue is virtually unknown.
It is true that there have been occasional cases '- in which the defect has
been of such a character that it could not have been prevented by any ordinary
care, and the application of res ipsa -has been denied. But such cases are so
extremely rare as to be almost negligible, and over many years very few of
them have appeared in the books. It is also true that it is open to the defend-
ant to rebut the inference of negligence by proof of his own due care. But,
again with very rare exceptions, ' 3 the courts are agreed that such evidence
does not entitle the defendant to a directed verdict, and raises only an issue
for the jury.12 4 And again it must be repeated, once the cause of the injury
is proved to lie with the defendant, once it is brought home to his plant, the
jury finds for the plaintiff. Why, then, do the plaintiffs and their cohorts clamor
so loudly for strict liability of the manufacturer, and why are the defendants
equally vociferous in their opposition?
Loch v. Confair, 372 Pa. 212, 93 A.2d 451 (1953). Maine and South Carolina accomplish
the same result under ordinary rules of circumstantial evidence. Lajoie v. Biledeau, 148
Me. 359, 93 A.2d 719 (1953); Merchant v. Columbia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 214 S.C.
206, 51 S.E2d 749 (1949). Michigan, after denying for years that it accepted res ipsa
loquitur, has at last admitted that it has been applying the doctrine all the time. Indiana
Lumbermen's Mut. Ins. Co. v. Matthew Stores, Inc., 349 Mich. 441, 84 N.W2d 755
(1957).
122. Sheffer v. Willoughby, 163 Ill. 518, 45 N.E. 253 (1896) (contaminated oysters);
H. J. Heinz Co. v. Duke, 196 Ark. 180, 116 S.W.2d 1039 (1938); Crocker v. Baltimore
Dairy Lunch Co., 214 Mass. 177, 100 N.E. 1078 (1913); O'Brien v. Louis K. Liggett Co.,
255 Mass. 553, 152 N.E. 57 (1926).
123. Nichols v. Continental Baking Co., 34 F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 19-29) ; Swenson v. Purity
Baking Co., 183 Minn. 289, 236 N.V. 310 (1931); Smith v. Salem Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 92 N.H. 97, 25 A.2d 125 (1942); cf. Walker v. Hickory Packing Co., 220 N.C. 158,
16 S.E2d 668 (1941) (contributory negligence).
Johnson v. Stoddard, 310 Mass. 232, 37 N.E.2d 505 (1941), a case of paratyphoid in
cream puffs, appears to be unique in that the defendant was able to show the specific cause
of the defect, a carrier not discovered until the plaintiff's illness was reported.
124. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Massey, 193 Ark. 423, 100 S.W.2d 681 (1937) ; Heckel
v. Ford Motor Co., 101 N.J.L. 385, 128 At. 242 (1925); De Lape v. Liggett & Meyers
Tobacco Co., 25 F. Supp. 1006 (D. Cal. 1939), aff'd, 109 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1940) ; Crigger
N% Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 132 Tenn. 545, 179 S.W. 155 (1915) ; Richenbacher v. California
Packing Corp., 250 Mass. 198, 145 N.E. 281 (1924); Bagre v. Daggett Chocolate Co.,
126 Conn. 659, 13 A.2d 757 (1940) ; Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Davidson, 193 Ark. 825,
102 S.W.2d 833 (1937) ; Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Creech, 245 Ky. 414, 53 S.W.2d 745
(1932) ; Doyle v. Continental Baking Co., 262 Mass. 516, 160 N.E. 325 (1928) ; Broadway
v. Grimes, 204 N.C. 623, 169 S.E. 194 (1933); Collins Baking Co. v. Savage, 227 Ala.
408, 150 So. 336 (1933) ; Minutilla v. Providence Ice Cream Co., 50 R.I. 43, 144 Ati. 884
(1929) ; Webb v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 121 V. Va. 115.2 S.E.2d 893 (1939);
Try-Me Beverage Co. v. Harris, 217 Ala. 302, 116 So. 147 (1928).
19601 1115
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
No writer seems to have suggested that the answer lies in the preparation
for trial, the negotiations for settlement, and the amount of the verdict. So
long as the negligence issue remains in the case, it must be litigated, and plain-
tiff's counsel must be prepared to examine and to cross-examine witnesses,
including even experts. He may even be forced to look up a little law, which
is a thing from which some personal injury lawyers notoriously shrink. So
long as there is the possibility that negligence may not be found, the defendant
is encouraged by vain hopes, and the plaintiff gnawed by lingering doubts;
and a case which can be decided for the defendant is worth less, in terms of
settlement, than one which can not. And so long as the defendant can introduce
evidence of his own due care, the possibility remains that it may influence
the size of the verdict, as jurymen impressed with it stubbornly hold out for
no liability, or a smaller sum.
All this, however, is but half of the picture. There are other sellers than
the manufacturer of the product. It will pass through the hands of a. whole
line of other dealers, and the plaintiff may have good reason to sue any or all
of them. The manufacturer is often beyond the jurisdiction.125 He may even,
in some cases, be unknown.1 26 If he is identified and can be sued, it is very
often impossible to pin the liability upon him. Even where there is a proved
defect which speaks of obvious negligence on the part of some one, it may still
not be possible to prove that it was on the part of the maker. The cracked Coca
Cola bottle may have been cracked long after it left his plant.121 And even
125. Cf. Burkhardt v. Armour & Co., 115 Conn. 249, 161 Ati. 385 (1932), where the
actual packer of canned corned beef was in Argentina, the first buyer a subsidiary cor-
poration in Argentina, the primary distributor who put his name on the can in Illinois, and
the retailer, the retail buyer and the injured consumer in Connecticut.
126. See Comarow v. Levy, 115 N.Y.S.2d 873 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
127. See Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Sullivan, 178 Tenn. 405, 158 S.W.2d 721
(1942) ; Cunningham v. Parkersburg Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 137 W. Va. 827, 74 S.E.2d
409 (1953) ; Maybach v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 359 Mo. 446, 222 S.W.2d 87 (19-19) ;
Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Reisinger, 68 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 1953) ; Keffer v. Logan
Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 141 W. Va. 839, 93 S.E.2d 225 (1956); Trust v. Arden Farms
Co., 50 Cal. 2d 217, 324 P.2d 583 (1958) ; Smith v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 97 N.H. 522,
92 A.2d 658 (1952) ; Hankins v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 151 Tex. 303, 249 S.W.2d 1008
(1952); Jordan v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 117 Utah 578, 218 P.2d 660 (1950) ; East Ky.
Beverage Co. v. Stumbo, 313 Ky. 66, 230 S.W.2d 106 (1950).
Here the courts have displayed considerable liberality in accepting as sufficient cir-
cumstantial evidence of a rather scanty character, as to proper handling by all intermediate
parties. See, e.g., Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co., 33 Cal. 2d 514, 203 P.2d 522 (1949);
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Hicks, 215 Ark. 803, 223 S.W.2d 762 (1949) ; Groves v. Florida
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 40 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 1949); Johnson v. Louisiana Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 63 So. 2d 459 (La. Ct. App. 1953); Poulos v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co,, 322
Mass. 386, 77 N.E.2d 405 (1948) ; Joly v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 115 Vt. 174, 55 A.2d
181 (1947) ; Ryan v. Adam Scheidt Brewing Co., 197 F.Zd 614 (3d Cir. 1952) ; Coca-Cola
Bottling Works, Inc. v. Crow, 291 S.W.2d 589 (Tenn. 1956); Bornstein v. Metropolitan
Bottling Co., 139 A.2d 404 (N.J. 1958); Zarling v. La Salle Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 2
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when the cause can be fixed upon the manufacturer, he may turn out, in these
days of chain stores and large supply houses, to be a small concern, operating
on a shoestring, and financially the least responsible person in the whole chain
of distribution.' 28 If the plaintiff is to recover at all, he must often look to the
wholesaler, the jobber, and the retailer.
It is here that negligence liability breaks down. The wholesaler, the jobber,
and the retailer normally are simply not negligent. They are under no duty to
test or inspect the chattel,' 0 and they do not do so; and when, as is usually
the case today, it comes to them in a sealed container, examination becomes
impossible without destroying marketability. No inference of negligence can
arise against these sellers, and res ipsa loquitur is of no use at all.
It is true that against the retailer, the consumer who buys for himself and
is injured can rely, in all but a few states, 130 upon the old sales warranties of
merchantable quality and fitness for the purpose.13' But so long as the privity
wall stands firm, these warranties are of no avail against the wholesaler ;lm nor
Wis. 2d 596, 87 N.W.2d 263 (1958) ; Weggeman v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 5 Wis. 2d 503,
93 NAV.2d 467 (1958).
Pennsylvania and Kansas have gone further, and in food cases have put the burden of
proof upon the defendants, thus compelling them to fight it out with one another. Loch v.
Confair, 372 Pa. 212, 93 A.2d 451 (1953) ; Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P2d 317
(1953). It is worthy of note that both states apply strict liability to the sale of food.
128. See Note, 37 CoLum. L. Ry. 77 (1937).
129. Kratz v. American Stores, 359 Pa. 335, 59 A.2d 138 (1948) ; Tourte v. Horton Mfg.
Co., 108 Cal. App. 22, 290 Pac. 919 (Dist. Ct. App. 1930) ; Zesch v. Abrasive Co., 353 Mo.
558, 183 S.W2d 140 (1944); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Marhenke, 121 F.2d 593 (9th Cir.
1941) ; Camden Fire Ins. Co. v. Peterman, 278 Mich. 615, 270 NAV. 807 (1937) ; Peaslee-
Gaulbert Co. v. McMath's Adm'r, 148 Ky. 265, 146 S.W. 770 (1912) ; Isbell v. Biederman
Furniture Co., 115 SAV.2d 46 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938); Belcher v. Goff Bros., 145 Va. 448,
134 S.E. 588 (1926) ; RESTATE xEnT, TORTs § 40? (Supp. 1948).
130. Particularly where the product is in a sealed container. Kirland v. Great At. &
Pac. Tea Co., 233 Ala. 404, 171 So. 735 (1937) ; Kroger Grocery Co. v. Lewelling, 165
Miss. 71, 145 So. 726 (1933); Wilkes v. Memphis Grocery Co., 23 Tenn. App. 550, 134
S.W.2d 929 (1939); Pennington v. Cranberry Fuel Co., 117 W. Va. 60, 186 S.E. 610
(1936).
131. Gindraux v. Maurice Mercantile Co., 4 Cal. 2d 206, 47 P2d 703 (1935) ; Sapiente
v. Waltuch, 127 Conn. 224, 15 A.2d 417 (1940); Sloan v. F. V. Woolworth Co., 193
Ill. App. 620 (1915); Martin v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 301 Ky. 429, 192 S.W.2d
201 (1946); Vieira v. Balsamo, 328 Mass. 37, 101 N.E.2d 371 (1951); Stave v. Giant
Food Arcade, 125 N.J.L. 512, 16 A2d 460 (Sup. Ct. 1940) b Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh
Mercantile Co., 345 Pa. 559, 28 A.2d 913 (1942); D'Onofrio v. First Nat'l Stores, Inc.,
68 R.I. 144, 26 A.2d 758 (1942); Rabb v. Covington, 215 N.C. 572, 2 S.E.2d 705 (1939):
Ryan v. Progressive Stores, 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931). See Prosser, The Implied
Warranty of MerchantabIc Quality, 27 Miz. L. REv. 117 (1943).
132. Lombardi v. California Packing Sales Co., 83 Ri. 51, 112 A.2d 701 (1955);
Flaccomio v. Eysink, 129 MNd. 367, 100 AtI. 510 (1916) ; Bowman Biscuit Co. v. Hines,
151 Tem. 370, 251 S.W.2d 153 (1952) ; Cochran v. McDonald, 23 Wash. 2d 348, 161 P.2d
305 (1945) ; Degouvela v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 231 'Mo. App. 447, 100 S.AV2d 336
(1937). o ;
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do they protect the buyer's wife or child, 33 his employee,iM4 his guest,8 5 his
donee, 136 or his subpurchaser13 7 The result has been such utterly preposterous
decisions as those holding that the wife who buys the sausage, handles it, cooks it,
eats it, and is poisoned by it, cannot recover because she was merely buying as the
agent of her husband, who was to pay -the bill and so is regarded as the con-
tracting party ;138 whereas the -husband, who never saw the food, can recover
on a warranty for the loss of her services.18 9 The arrant folly of this has led
to some remarkable legal gymnastics, in the form of contradictory presump-
tions or holdings as to agency,140 and to specific provisions in the new Uniform
133. Sterchi Bros. Stores v. Castleberry, 28 Ala. App. 281, 182 So. 471 (1938) ; Pearl
v. Win. Filene's Sons Co., 317 Mass. 529, 58 N.E.2d 825 (1945), Welsh v. Ledyard, 167
Ohio St. 57, 146 N.E.2d 299 (1957); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Marhenke, 121 F.2d 598
(9th Cir. 1941) (dictum); Conner v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 25 F. Supp. 855 (W.D.
Mo. 1939) ; Hanback v. Dutch Baker Boy, Inc., 70 tApp. D.C. 398, 107 FZd 203 (1939) ;
Duncan v. Juman, 25 N.J. Super. 330, 96 A.2d 415 (App. Div. 1953); Borucki v. Mc-
Kenzie Bros. Co., 125 Conn. 92, 3 A.2d 224 (1938) ; Hopkins v. Amtorg Trading Corp.,
265 App. Div. 278, 38 N.Y.S.2d 788 (1942) ; Salzano v. First Nat'l Stores, Inc., 268 App.
Div. 993, 51 N.Y.S.2d 645 (1944) ; Massey v. Borden Co., 265 App. Div. 839, 37 N.Y.S.2d
571 (1942) ; Redmond v. Borden's Farm Prods. Co., 245 N.Y. 512, 157 N.E. 838 (1927) ;
Binion v. Sasaki, 5 Cal. App. 2d 15, 41 P.2d 585 (Dist. Ct. App. 1935) ; Stave v. Giant Food
Arcade, 125 N.J.L. 512, 16 A2d 460 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Colonna v. Rosedale Dairy Co., 166
Va. 314, 186 S.E. 94 (1936); Schlosser v. Goldberg, 123 N.J.L. 470, 9 A.2d 699 (Sup.
Ct. 1939) (husband).
134. Green v. Equitable Powder Mfg. Co., 94 F. Supp. 126 (W.D. Ark. 1950) ; Collum
v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 135 Cal. App. 2d 653, 288 P2d 75 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955); Duart
v. Axton-Cross Co., 19 Conn. Sup. 188, 1,10 A.2d 647 (1954); Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co.,
235 N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576 (1923) ; Bourcheix v. Willow Brook Dairy, Inc., 268 N.Y. 1,
196 N.E. 617 (1935) (dictum).
135. Conner v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 25 F. Supp. 855 (W.D. Mo. 1939); Salzano
v. First Nat'l Stores, Inc., 268 App. Div. 993, 51 N.YS2d 522 (1944).
136. Burgess v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 264 F.2d 495 (10th Cir. 1959) ; Prinsen
v. Russos, 194 Wis. 142, 215 N.W. 905 (1927); Brussels v. Grand Union Co., 14 N.J.
Misc. 751, 187 A. 582 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
137 Del Gaudio v. Ingerson, 19 Conn. Sup. 151, 110 A.2d 626 (1954); Welshauseu v.
Charles Parker Co., 83 Conn. 231, 76 Atl. 271 (1910).
138. Gearing v. Berkson, 223 Mass. 257, 111 N.E. 785 (1916); Hazelton v. First
Nat'l Stores, 88 N.H. 409, 190 Atl. 280 (1937) ; see Vaccaro v. Prudential Condensed Milk
Co., 133 Misc. 556, 232 N.Y. Supp. 299 (1927).
139. Kennedy v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 205 App. Div. 648, 200 N.Y. Supp. 121 (1923)
(loss of child's services) ; Jackson v. Watson & Sons, [1909] 2 K.B. 193. But see Gimenez
v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea &o., 264 N.Y. 390, 191 N.E. 27 (1934).
140. Thus where the wife is injured, she is found to be the principal, and the buyer.
Gimenez v. Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co., 264 N.Y. 390, 191 N.E. 27 (1934) ; Hailer v. Rud-
mann, 249 App. Div. 831, 292 N.Y. Supp. 586 (1937); McSpedon v. Kunz, 245 App. Div.
824, 281 N.Y. Supp. 147 (1935). Where it is the husband who suffers injury, the wife
is found to have bought as his agent. Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc., 255 N.Y.
388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931) ; Visusil v. W. T. Grant Co., 253 App. Div. 736, 300 N.Y. Supp.
652 (1937); Vaccarino v. Cozzubo, 181 Md. 614, 31 A2d 316 (1943).
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Commercial Code and in a Connecticut statute,14 ' which extend the retailer's
warranty to all members of the buyer's household.
Such are the plaintiff's grievances, and such his claim to redress. When
we come to the arguments adduced in support of his claim, we are confronted
with more than a few which have a specious and unconvincing sound, and
would appear to have been concocted in -the heads of professors rather than
based upon any realities of the situation. It is said, for example, that strict
liability will provide a healthy and highly desirable incentive for producers
to make their products safe. A skeptic may well question whether the callous
manufacturer, who is unmoved by the prospect of negligence liability, plus
res ipsa loquitur, and by the effect of any injury whatever upon the reputation
of his goods,142 will really be stimulated by the relatively slight increase in
possible liability to take additional precautions against defects which cannot
be prevented by only reasonable care.
It is said that it is the practice of reputable makers expressly to warrant
their products, or to make good their deficiencies without such a warranty ;
and that the strict-liability rule merely enforces what the best companies
already do. Undoubtedly the practice exists, on a large scale; but it is limited,
on the part of almost every one, to replacement, repair, or return of the pur-
chase price to make good the original bargain; and it does not extend to
compensation for injuries to the person of the buyer, or his other property.43'
It is said, again, that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applied, in many cases,
to impose liability upon defendants who in reality have not been negligent
at all; and that the strict liability merely formulates, as a general rule, what
goes on all the time in fact. The hypothesis is very likely true, although it
is not capable of proof, and the number of instances in which it has occured is
probably far smaller than the -proponents would have us believe; but the con-
clusion does not follow. One might as well say that because circumstantial
evidence sometimes results in the conviction of the innocent, all criminal de-
141. UNIFO CosiRcLL CODE § 2-318 (1958 ed.) ; Coxx. GmN. STAT. § 42-14 (1958),
amending UmfoRm SA ES Acr §§ 15(1), (2).
142. Furthermore, what is probably a more powerful incentive to make products as
safe as possible lies in the desire of manufacturers to avoid the danger that their
products will develop a reputation for being unsafe or defective and therefore be
unacceptable to the purchasing public. Every manufacturing executive with whom
the writer has discussed this matter regards it as a potential disaster when one of its
products is found to be defective and the cause of an injury. The element which ic
most disturbing to manufacturers is not the potential judgment of legal liability
but the injury which is done to the reputation of the product and its producer.
While it may be conceivable -that the imposition of strict liability could increase in
some small measure the pressure upon a few backward manufacturers to make their
products safe, it is doubtful that it will add very much to existing pressures.
Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in Products-Anl
Opposing View, 24 TaNN. L. REv. 938, 945 (1957).
143. See Bogert and Fink, Business Practice Regarding Warranties in the Sale of
Goods, 25 IL. L. Rnv. 400 (1930).
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fendants should be found guilty; or that, because skid marks on the pavement
may now and then permit the jury to find against defendants who in fact
have exercised all due care, all automobile drivers should be held liable with-
out fault.
Entitled to more respect is the "risk-spreading" argument, which maintains
that the manufacturers, as a group and an industry, should absorb the inevit-
able losses which must result in a complex civilization from the use of their
products, because they are in the better position to do so, and through their
prices to pass such losses on to the community at large. This contention has
become identified with the concurring opinion of Justice Traynor of California
in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,1 44 because of the following language:
Those who stiffer injury from defective products are unprepared to
meet its consequences. The cost of an injury and the loss of time or
health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and
a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer
and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business. It is to the
public interest to discourage the marketing of products having defects
that are a menace to the public. If such products nevertheless find their
way into the market it is to the public interest to place the responsibility
for whatever injury they may cause upon the manufacturer, who, even
if he is not negligent in the manufacture of the product, is responsible
for its reaching the market. However intermittently such injuries may
occur and however haphazardly they may strike, the risk of their occur-
rence is a constant risk and a general one. Against such a risk there
should be general and constant protection and the manufacturer is best
situated to afford such protection.
Dean Pound 145 once denounced this as a piece of "authoritarian law," and
a major step in the direction of socialism. Assuming that we are not nowadays
disposed to flee shrieking in terror from the prospect of a spot of socialism in
our law when the public interest demands it, the question remains whether
our courts, our legislators, and public sentiment in general, are yet ready to
adopt so sweeping a legal philosophy, and to impose so heavy a burden abruptly
and all at once upon all producers. Thus far there has been relatively little in-
dication that the time is yet ripe for what may very possibly be the law of fifty
years ahead. As in the case of the related agitation for strict liability on the
part of all automobile drivers, there are too many vested interests in the way,
and the sudden change is likely to be regarded as too radical and disruptive;
144. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944).
It is something of a misrepresentation to cite the opinion of Justice Traynor in the
Escola case, as it has often been cited, without pointing out that although concurring, it
was not concurred in; that six other justices did not agree with it, and no opinion of any
other justice of the Supreme Court of California ever has agreed; and that it is not yet the
law of California. Also that the passage quoted is only one small part of a lengthy opinion
which states a good many other arguments for strict liability.
145. POUND, Nav PATHS OF THE LAW 39-47 (1950). In the intervening decade, Dean
Pound has swung over to agree with justice Traynor. Pound, The Problem of the Explod-
ing Bottle, 40 B.U.L. Rxv. 167 (1.960).
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and progress in the direction of any such broad general rule cannot be expected
to be rapid.
Dedicated writers have laid great stress upon liability insurance as the con-
trolling and decisive factor in this situation. It seems very significant that,
except for the casual reference in the lone opinion of Justice Traynor in the
passage quoted above, no court, so far as can be discovered, ever has so much
as mentioned insurance in a products-liability case. What insurance can do, of
course, is to distribute losses proportionately among a group who are to bear
them. What it cannot and should not do is to determine whether the group
shall bear them in the first instance-and whether, for example, consumers
shall be compelled to accept substantial price increases on everything they buy
in order to compensate others for their misfortunes. Even the distribution of
the losses through insurance may be a process that has its flaws. Until we
develop, by analogy to workmen's compensation, a comprehensive system of
compulsory insurance with rigidly limited damages-wldch no one as yet seems
to have proposed specifically in this particular field '--there will always be
uninsured defendants, there will always be liability in excess of coverage, and
there will be members of the group whose competitive situation does not per-
mit them to pass on the cost of the insurance to their customers. 47 Liability
146. See, however, Feldman, Liability of Manufacturers of Home Furnishdngs for lfarm
Ddne by the Product, 1955 Ixs. L.J. 519, 560, suggesting legislation providing that a
manufacturer who carries "full aid" accident insurance in statutory minimum amounts ior
the protection of consumers shall be relieved from lis common law liability for negligence.
This idea is borrowed from Professor Ehrenzweig.
147. The fact is, however, that most of our manufacturering industries are not munopo-
lies in which the manufacturers can dictate price. In these industries prices are
determined by a host of factors. The intensity of competition, the stage of the business
cycle, the facility with which capital can move in and out of the industry, changes
in public desires and tastes, and technological developments in the field are only a
few of the variables constantly influencing price and causing price fluctuations. As
a result of these economic factors it may often be a matter of pure chance as to
whether a given manufacturer or industry can adjust its price structure to absorb
a new cost thrust upon it. In the case of an individual, an increase may mean pricing
himself out of the market In the case of an industry a substantial general addition
to price may have a devastating effect upon marginal producers. In some industries
such additions may be substantial, for product liability costs are high. The repre-
sentative of one manufacturer with whom the writer has discussed the general
subject estimated that product liability cost for his company, even under the present
system is about one and one-half million dollars a year.
It is a common failing to overlook the problem of the small manufacturer. When
social reformers speak of "manufacturers" they generally assume that all manu-
facturers are in the position of U.S. Steel Corporation or General Motors or
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey. It may very well be (leaving out considera-
tions of justice) that large organizations of this character can absorb or distribute
an item of increased cost such as that which would result from the imposition of
strict liability. But many manufacturers are in a totally different situation. Their
position in the industry is vulnerable and their competitive situation delicate. It is
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insurance is obviously not to be ignored; 'but it is a makeweight, and not the
heart and soul of the problem.
No more impressive are some of the arguments advanced in behalf of the
defendant. One is that strict liability will deter producers who seek to im-
prove their products from adopting new methods. The short answer is that
if they are not already deterred by existing liabilities, they are not likely to
be. Another is that strict liability will expose the defendants to a deluge of
false claims based upon fictitious defects and fake injuries. Undoubtedly there
are, and will be, false claims, and it may be true that "the rats of Hamlin
were as nought in comparison with that 'horde of mice which has sought re-
freshment within ,Coca-Cola 'bottles and died of a happy surfeit.' 148 But the
assumption apparently is that the fraudulent claimant, when he is inventing a
defect in the product, will by choice invent one which does not indicate any
negligence. This speaks for itself. It is also said that liability should never
rest upon anything but fault, which is a position certainly out of date in this
day and generation; and that only the legislature should make any such
changes, which is the cry invariably raised against anything new whatever in
the law.
All this aside, the arguments which have proved convincing to the courts
which 'have accepted the strict liability are three:
1. The public interest in human life, health and safety demands the naxi-
mum possible protection that the law can give against dangerous defects in
products which consumers must buy, and against which they are helpless to
protect themselves; and it justifies the imposition, upon all suppliers of such
products, of full responsibility for the harm they cause, even though the sup-
plier has not been negligent. 4 9 This argument, which in the last analysis rests
these comparatively small manufacturers who suffer when additional costs are
added without regard to their situation.
Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in Products-An
Opposing View, 24 TENN. L. Rxv. 938, 947 (1957).
It is worthy of note that Dean Leon Green, who has been one of the most vigorous
advocates of strict liability for automobile drivers, does not favor its extension to "mechanical
products." Green, Should the Manufacturer of General Products Be Liable Without
Negligence? 24 TrN. L. Rzv. 928, 933 (1957).
148. Spruill, Privity of Contract as a Requisite for Recovery on Warranty, 19 N.C.L.
REv. 551, 566 (1941).
149. It is a well-known fact that articles of food are manufactured and placed in the
channels of commerce, %%ith the intention that they shall pass from hand to hand
until they are finally used by some remote consumer. It is usually impracticable,
if not impossible, for the ultimate consumer to analyze the food and ascertain whether
or not it is suitable for human consumption. Since it has been packed and placed
on the market as a food for human consumption, and marked as such, the purchaser
usually eats it or causes it to be served to his family without the precaution of having
it analyzed by a technician to ascertain whether or not it is suitable for human
consumption. In fact, in most instances the only satisfactory examination that
could be made would be only at the time and place of the processing of the food.
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upon public sentiment, has had its greatest force in the cases of food, where
there was once popular outcry against an evil industry, and injuries and
actions have multiplied, and public feeling is most obvious. It is now being
advanced as to other products for bodily use, such as cosmetics. It suggests
that as to still other products, distinctions may yet be drawn according to the
probable danger, the frequency of injury, and what the public reasonably and
rightfully expects.
2. The supplier, by placing the goods upon the market, represents to the
public that they are suitable and safe for use; and by packaging, advertising
or otherwise, he does everything that he can to induce that belief. He intends
and expects that -the product will be purchased and used in reliance upon this
assurance of safety; and it is in fact so purchased and used. The middleman is
no more than conduit, a mere mechanical device, through whom the thing
sold is to reach the ultimate user. The supplier has invited and solicited the
use; and when it leads to disaster, he should not be permitted to avoid the
responsibility by saying that he has made no contract with the consumer'"
3. It is already possible to enforce strict liability by resort to a series of
actions, in which the retailer is first held liable on a warranty to his purchaser,
It seems to be the rule that where food products sold for human consumption are
unfit for that purpose, there is such an utter failure of the purpose for which the
food is sold, and the consequences of eating unsound food are so disastrous to human
health or life, that the law imposes a warranty of purity in favor of the ultimate
consumer as a matter of public policy.
Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 612, 164 S.W.2d 828, 29 (1942).
150. A party who processes a product and gives it the appearance of being suitable
for human consumption, and places it in the channels of commerce, expects some
one to consume the food in reliance upon its appearance that it is suitable for
human consumption. He expects the appearance of suitableness to continue with
the product until some one is induced to consume it as food. But a modern manu-
facturer or vendor does even more than this under modern practices. He not only
processes the food and dresses it up so as to make it appear appetizing, but he uses
the newspapers, magazines, billboards, and the radio to build up the psycholtigv
-to buy and consume his products. The invitation extended by him is not only to
the house wife to buy and serve his product, but to the members of the family and
guests to eat it. In fact, the manufacturer's interest in the product is not terminated
when he has sold it to the wholesaler. He must get it off the wholesaler's shelves
before the wholesaler will buy a new supply. The same is not only true of the
retailer, but of the house wife, for the house wife will not buy more until the
family has consumed that which she has in her pantry. Thus the manufacturer
or other vendor intends that this appearance of suitability of the article for human
consumption should continue and be effective until some one is induced thereby to
consume the goods. It would be but to acknowledge a weakness in the law to my
that he could thus create a demand for his products by inducing a belief that they
are suitable for human consumption, when, as a matter of fact, they are not, and
reap the benefits of the public confidence thus created, and then avoid liability
for the injuries caused thereby merely because there was no privity of contract
between him and the one whom he induced to consume the food.
Id. at 619, 164 S.W.2d at 832-33.
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and indemnity on a warranty is then sought successively from other suppliers,
until the manufacturer finally pays the damages, with the added costs of re-
peated litigation. 151 This is an expensive, time-consuming, and wasteful pro-
cess, and it may be interrupted by insolvency, lack of jurisdiction, disclaimers, or
the statute of limitations, anywhere along the line. What is needed is a blanket
rule which makes any supplier in the chain liable directly to the ultimate user, and
so short-circuits the whole unwieldy process. This is in the interest, not only
of the consumer, but of the courts, and even on occasion of the suppliers
themselves.
"'WAPRANTY"
The early food cases suggested nothing very much in the way of a legal
theory to support the strict liability, other than the obvious panacea of "public
policy." As the decisions continued, there was an extended period during
which courts proceeded to invent a remarkable variety of highly ingenious,
and equally unconvincing, theories of fictitious agency, third-party-beneficiary
contract, and the like, to get around the lack of privity between the plaintiff
and the defendant. The unusual industry of Mr. Cornelius W. Gillam 15- has
collected no less than twenty-nine such triumphs of juridical technique, and
one cannot do better than to borrow them from him in a footnote, with appre-
ciation.153 Some of them still find occasional use in cases where the court is
151. See, e.g., Tri-City Fur Foods, Inc. v. Ammerman, 7 Wis. 2d 149, 96 N.W.2d
495 (1959). In this connection, there is frequent mention of Kasler & Cohen v. Slavouski,
[1928] 1 K.B. 78, where there was a series of five recoveries, and the manufacturer
ultimately paid the consumer's damages, plus a much larger sum covering the heavy
costs of the entire litigation.
152. Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. Rsv. 119, 153-55 (1957).
153. The retailer is the consumer's agent to buy. Wisdom v. Morris Hardware Co.,
151 Wash. 86, 274 Pac. 1050 (1929).
The retailer is the manufacturer's agent to sell. Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27
Ohio App. 475, 482, 161 N.E. 557, 559 (1928).
The retailer assigns his warranty from the manufacturer to the consumer. Madouros
v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 90 S.W.2d 445 (1936).
The consumer is a third party beneficiary of the retailer's contract with the manu-
facturer. Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928).
The manufacturer's marketing of the goods is an offer to the consumer to warrant
them if he will buy. Timberland Lumber Co. v. Climax Mfg. Co., 61 F.2d 391 (3d Cir.
1932).
The manufacturer makes a continuing unilateral offer to the consumer. Carlill
v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., [1893] 1 Q.B. 256.
The manufacturer's marketing of the goods is in itself a representation to the con-
sumer that they are fit to buy. Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176
N.W. 382 (1920).
The defendant is unable to overcome the inference of negligence from circumstantial
evidence. Parks v. G. C. Yost Pie Co., 93 Kan. 334, 144 Pac. 202 (1914); Jackson
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Chapman, 106 Miss. 864, 64 So. 791 (1914).
There is an irrebuttable presumption of negligence. Crigger v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co., 132 Tenn. 545, 179 S.W. 155 (1915).
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unwilling to state any broader rule of strict liability. 54 Out of all this welter,
A warranty "runs with the goods" from the manufacturer to the consumer. Coca Cola
Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, Ill So. 305 (1927).
The manufacturer's warranty to the retailer somehow "inures to the consumer's
benefit." Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939).
A warranty runs with food contents from the manufacturer to the consumer, but does
not run with the food container. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 10
P.2d 436 (1944).
Pure food statutes make the manufacturer a guarantor of his product to the consumer.
Hunter v. Derby Foods, 110 F.2d 970 (2d Cir. 1940).
Warranty is hopelessly confused with negligence. Hertzler v. Manshum, 228 Mich.
416, 200 N.W. 155 (1924).
Food cases are a special exception to the privity rule, and a law unto themselves.
Herzler v. Manshum, 228 Mich. 416, 200 N.W. 155 (1924); Mazetti v. Armour & Cu.,
75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913).
The privity rule is repudiated outright as contrary to public policy in fuod cases.
Williams v. Campbell Soup Co., SO F. Supp. 865 (W.D. Mo. 1948).
The privity rule is simply rejected without explanation. Blanton v. Cudahy Packing
Co., 154 Fla. 872, 19 So. 2d 313 (1944).
The privity rule is simply ignored. Rainwater v. Hattiesburg Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
151 Mfiss. 315, 95 So. 444 (1923).
There is an implied warranty "created by implication of law independent of the con-
tract." Flessher v. Carstens Packing Co., 93 Wash. 48, 52, 160 Pac. 14, 15 (1916).
Section 15(1) of the Uniform Sales Act abolishes the requirement of privity. Klein
v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P2d 799 (1939).
Section 15(2) of the Uniform Sales Act includes the consumer as a "buyer." Note,
25 WAsH. U.L.Q. 293 (1940); 42 H Av. L. RE,. 414 (1929); see generally Note, 33
COLum. L. REv. 868 (1933).
Section 15(2) of the Uniform Sales Act includes the manufacturer as a "seller." Note,
22 WAsH. U.L.Q. 406 (1937).
Section 15(2) of the Uniform Sales Act somehow extends the implied warranty oi
fitness for the general purpose to the consumer. See DMcuasoN, Pnonucrs LmmmUV"
AND THE FooD CoNsua.m 107 (1951).
Impleader sidesteps the privity requirement. Cohen v. Dugan Bros., Inc., 134 Misc.
155, 235 N.Y. Supp. 118 (Sup. Ct. 1929).
Notice and opportunity to defend make an adverse finding against the retailer binding
upon the manufacturer, against whom the retailer has a claim over. Carleton v. Lombard,
Ayers & Co., 149 N.Y. 137, 43 N.E. 422 (1896).
The manufacturer's advertising is an express warranty to the consumer. Baxter v.
Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932).
The manufacturer's advertising is a negligent misrepresentation to the consumer. Note,
22 WAsa. U.L.Q. 406 (1937); Crist v. Art Metal Works, 230 App. Div. 114, 243 N.Y.
Supp. 496 (1930).
The manufacturer's advertising is an unintentional deceit. Baxter v. Ford Motor Co.,
175 Wash. 123, 35 P.2d 1090 (1934).
The manufacturer is estopped from denying that he has made representations to the
consumer. Steensland, Liability of the Manufacturer td the Ultinate Consumer Under
Modern, Merchandizing Practices, 9 Mo1xT. L. Rm. 101, 107 (1948).
154. A late example is Freeman v. Navarre, 47 Wash. 2d 760, 289 P2d 1015 (1955),
where the retailer was held to be consumer's agent to buy pipe from the manufacturer.
It is discussed in Gillam, Judicial Legislation, Legal Fiction$, and Products Liability:
The Agency Theory, 37 Oma. L. REv. 217 (1958).
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the theory which finally emerged and won the day was that of an implied
"warranty," either running with the goods to the consumer or made directly
to him; and in the last decade warranty is virtually the only theory which has
appeared in the decisions.
The adoption of this particular device was facilitated by the peculiar and
uncertain nature and character of warranty, a freak hybrid born of the illicit
intercourse of tort and contract. "A more notable example of legal miscege-
nation could hardly be cited than that which produced the modern action for
breach of warranty. Originally sounding in tort,6 5 yet arising out of the war-
rantor's consent to be bound, 1 6 it later ceased necessarily to be consensual,"'0
and at the same time came to lie mainly in contract." 15 8
The action for breach of warranty was originally one on the case, sound-
ing in tort and closely allied to deceit, from which it was not distinguished;
and it was not until 1778 150 that the contract action was held to lie at all.
It is undisputed that the original tort form of action, as on the case, still sur-
vives to the present day, and may everywhere be maintained. 100 Nor is this
a mere technical matter of procedure, since there are many decisions which
have held that the tort aspects of warranty permit the application of a tort
rather than a contract rule, in such matters as the survival of actions,101 the
statute of limitations, 16 2 the measure of damages, 16 or recovery for wrongful
155. Ames, History of Assumpsit, 2 HAnv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1888) ; 1 WILLIsTON, SAUS
368-369 (2d ed. 1924); 1 STRar, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LmiiTy 377 (1906).
156. Originally the seller was bound only by express words of warranty. Cliandelor
v. Lopus, Cro. Jac. 4, 79 Eng. Rep. 3 (Exch. 1603).
157. Implied warranties of title were recognized first, and later warranties of quality
were implied. Medina v. Stoughton, 1 Salk. 210, 1 Ld. Raym. 593, 91 Eng. Rep, 188
(K.B. 1700); Holcombe v. Hewson, 2 Camp. 391, 170 Eng. Rep. 1194 (K.B. 1810);
Gardiner v. Gray, 4 Camp. 144, 171 Eng. Rep. 46 (K.B. 1815); Jones v. Bright, 5 Bing.
533, 130 Eng. Rep. 1167 (C.P. 1829).
158. 42 HARV. L. Rv. 414 (1929).
159. Stuart v. Wilkins, 1 Doug. 18, 99 Eng. Rep. 15 (K.B. 1778). The practice
had, however, apparently been adopted for some time, and was resorted to -because of the
procedural convenience of joining money counts in order to recover the price paid.
See Williamson v. Allison, 2 East 446, 102 Eng. Rep. 439 (K.B. 1802).
160. Shippen v. Bowen, 122 U.S. 575 (1887); Arnold v. White, 153 Mich. 607, 117
N.W. 164 (1908); Farrell v. Manhattan Market Co., 193 Mass. 271, 84 N.E. 481 (1908);
Standard Paint Co. v. E. K. Vietor & Co., 120 Va. 595, 91 S.E. 752 (1917); Greenwood
v. John R. Thompson Co., 213 Ill. App. 371 (1919); Wells v. Oldsmobile Co., 147 Ore.
687, 35 P.2d 232 (1934) ; Greco v. S. S. Kresge Co., 277 N.Y. 26, 12 N.E.2d 557 (1938) ;
McLachlan v. Wilmington Dry Goods Co., 41 Del. 378, 22 A.2d 851 (1941); Spillane
v. Corey, 323 Mass. 673, 84 N.E.2d 5 (1940); Simone v. John J. Felin & Co., 35 Pa.
D. & C. 645 (C.P. 1939); Burgess v. Sanitary Meat Market, 121 W. Va. 605, 5 S.E2d
785 (1939). See the discussion in Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953).
161. Gosling v. Nichols, 59 Cal. App. 2d 442, 139 P.2d 86 (1943); Bernstein v.
Queens County Jockey Club, 222 App. Div. 191, 225 N.Y. Supp. 449 (1927).
162. Jones v. Boggs & Buhl, 355 Pa. 242, 49 A.2d 379 (1946); Rubino v. Utah
Canning Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d 18, 266 P.2d 163 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954); Finck v. Albers
Super Market Co., 136 F.2d 191 (6th Cir. 1943). Accord, Schlick v. New York Dugan
1126 [ Vol. 69:1099
STRICT LIABILITY TO THE CONSUMER
death.' Beyond this, the old tort character has continued to color the sub-
stantive law of warranty itself, by perpetuating the idea of a misrepresentation
of fact, however innocent, and of a liability arising and imposed by operation
of law, which is quite independent of any intention to agree upon terms as a
matter of facL.0 5 Thus there are a great many cases, even between the im-
mediate parties, in which to say that the warranty is a term of the contract
is "to speak the language of pure fiction."' 0 6
The conclusion from all this is obvious. If warranty is a matter of tort
as well as contract, and if it can arise without any intent to make it a matter
of contract, then it should need no contract; and it may arise and exist be-
tween parties who have not dealt with one another. Notwithstanding this
ready-to-hand logic, however, the concept of warranty has involved so many
major difficulties and disadvantages that it is very questionable whether it
has not become rather a burden than a boon to the courts in what they are try-
ing to accomplish. Some of these difficulties are the following:
1. Although it was always possible to enforce a warranty by a tort form
of action, there was no English or early American case in wlhich the warranty
itself was found to exist in the absence of a contract between the plaintiff
and the defendant. This may very possibly have been due merely to the
accidental fact that cases without contract simply did not arise. Nevertheless,
once the contract action was established it came into such universal and almost
exclusive use that, in the minds of nearly all courts and lawyers, warranty,
whether express or implied, became definitely identified with the contract,
and regarded as an integral and inseparable part of it. This attitude persists
Bros., 175 Misc. 182, 22 N.Y.S2d 238 (N.Y.C. City Ct. 1940), overruled in Blessington v.
McCrory Stores Corp., 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421. Contra, Challis v. Hartloff, 136 Kan.
823, 18 P.2d 199 (1933).
163. See Amram & Goodman, Somne Problemns in the Law of Implied Warranty, 3
SYRAcUsE L. REv. 259 (1952). Cf. Medeiros v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 57 Cal. App. 2d
707, 135 P.2d 676 (Dist. Ct. App. 1943).
164. Greco v. S. S. Kresge Co., 277 N.Y. 26, 12 N.E.2d 557 (1938); Greenwood v.
John R. Thompson Co., 213 Ill. App. 371 (1919); Parks v. G. C. Yost Pie Cu.. 93 Kal.
334, 144 Pac. 202 (1914); Schuler v. Union News Co., 295 Mass. 350, 4 N.E.2d 465
(1936) ; B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959) ; Hinton v. Repub-
lic Aviation Corp., 180 F. Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
Other decisions have held to the contrary, on the ground that the gist of v-rranty
has become contract. Wadleigh v. Howson, 88 N.L 365, 189 At. 865 (1937) ; Goodwin
v. Misticos, 207 Miss. 361, 42 So. 2d 397 (1949) ; Whiteley v. Webb's City, Inc., 55 So.
2d 730 (Fla. 1951) ; Sterling Aluminum Prods., Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 140 F.2d 801 (8th
Cir. 1944). S. H. Kress & Co. v. Lindsey, 262 Fed. 331 (5th Cir. 1919).
165. Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N.W. 790 (1927) ; Hoe v. Sanborn, 21
N.Y. 552, 78 Am. Dec. 163 (1860) ; Lee v. Cohrt, 57 S.D. 387, 232 N.W. 900 (1930) ;
Linn v. Radio Center Delicatessen, 169 Misc. 879, 9 N.Y.S.2d 110 (N.Y.C. Munic. Ct.
1939) ; Little v. G. E. Van Syckle & Co., 115 Mich. 480, 73 N.W. 554 (1893) ; Hooven
& Allison Co. v. Wirtz, 15 N.D. 477, 107 NAV. 1078 (1906).
166. Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentalion, 24 HAMnv. L. RM 415, 420
(1911). See also Smith, Surviving Fictions, 27 YAxL L.J. 147, 317, 326 (1917).
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to such an extent that the theory of warranty, far from being an aid to the
recognition of strict liability to the consumer, has proved in many jurisdictions
to be an actual deterrent; and in all probability this has considerably delayed
any change in the law.
2. The same attitude may very possibly prevent the recovery of any dam-
ages which are not within the purview of breach of contract, such as those for
wrongful death.167
3. Traditionally, warranty requires that the plaintiff shall act in reliance
upon some representation or assurance, or some promise or undertaking, given
to him 'by the defendant.'0 8 This is extraordinarily difficult, and may be quite
impossible, to make out where, as is frequently the case, the consumer does
not know who has made or sold the goods, and does not care. The husband
or guest who eats a plate of beans seldom asks the housewife whose product
they are, and still less often at what store she bought them. Even the pur-
chaser at retail who eats the beans himself may be ignorant of the brand he
buys, or utterly indifferent to it.169 If the theory of warranty is to be applied
as in ordinary sales cases, this may be a serious obstacle to recovery. Even
yet there are still a few jurisdictions in which the supposed absence of reliance
upon the retailer has prevented any recovery against him by a direct pur-
chaser, when the goods are sold in a sealed container. 170
4. Warranties on the sale of goods are governed in thirty-five states by
the Uniform Sales Act,1 1 a codification of the common-law rules, which was
167. See cases cited note 164 supra.
168. See Noble v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 12 F. Supp. 181 (W.D. Wash. 1935);
Davis v. Williams, 50 Ga. App. 274, 198 S.E. 357 (1938); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.
v. Walker, 104 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1937); Walden v. Wheeler, 153 Ky. 181,
154 S.W. 1088 (1913); Kroger Grocery Co. v. Lexvelling, 165 Miss. 71, 145 So. 726
(1933); McMurray v. Vaughn's Seed Store, 117 Ohio St. 236, 157 N.E. 567 (1927).
169. Thus in Randall v. Goodrich-Gamble Co., 238 Minn. 10, 54 N.W.2d 769 (1952),
the buyer of a bottle of linament with an express warranty on the label was denied
recovery against the manufacturer, because he paid no attention to it at the time of
purchase. Accord, Dobbin v. Pacific Coast Coal Co., 25 Wash. 2d 190, 170 P.2d 642
(1946) ; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Marhenke, 121 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1941) ; Torpey v. Red
Owl Stores, Inc., 228 F. 2d 1,17 (8th Cir. 1955). Compare Senter v. B. F. Goodrich Co.,
127 F. Supp. 705 (D. Colo. 1954).
170. Kirkland v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 233 Ala. 404, 171 So. 735 (1937);
Postell v. Boykin Tool & Supply Co., 86 Ga. App. 400, 71 S.E2d 783 (1952); Kroger
Grocery Co. v. Lewelling, 165 Miss. 71, 145 So. 726 (1933); Wilkes v. Memphis Grocery
Co., 23 Tenn. App. 550, 134 S.W.2d 929 (1939); Pennington v. Cranberry Fuel Co., 117
W. Va. 680, 186 S.E. 610 (1936).
See generally Waite, Retail Responsibility and Judicial Lawnmaking, 34 Mxcar. L. RLv,
494 (1936); Brown, The Liability of Retail Dealers for Defective Fodd Products, 23
MiNN. L. Ray. 585 (1939); Waite, Retail Responsibility-A Reply, 23 MINN. L. RLv.
612 (1939); Leidy, Another New Tort? 38 MixcH. L. REv. 964 (1940); Prosser, The
Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MixN. L. REv. 117 (1943).
171. 1 Uxnolums LAws AxN. §§ 12-16 (1950).
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promulgated in 1906 at a time when there was no such thing as a warranty
to any third person. The definitions of "buyer" and "seller" in the act 1 7
were drawn with the immediate parties to the sale in mind, and it specifically
provides that there are no implied warranties of quality except as set forth.173
As a result the act has been held often enough to preclude any warranty to
one who does not buy from the defendantY7 4 The courts which seek to impose
such a warranty must either ignore these provisions or construe them away.3 n
The new Uniform Commercial Code,'" which has replaced the Sales Act
in a small number of states, extends the warranty only to the family, house-
hold or guest of the immediate buyer.
5. Furthermore, the implied warranties of the Sales Act are limited in
their scope. The warranty of fitness for the purpose can arise only if the buyer
makes -his purpose known to the seller and relies upon the seller's skill or
judgment. The warranty of merchantable quality arises only if the goods are
bought by description from a seller who deals in goods of that description. If
the buyer has examined the goods, there is no implied warranty as to defects
which such examination ought to have revealed; and there is no warranty
of fitness for any particular purpose on the sale of a specified article under
172. "'Buyer' means a person who buys or agrees to buy goods or any legal suc-
cessor in interest of such person....
"'Seller' means a person who sells or agrees to sell goods, or any legal successor
in the interest of such person." 1A UNrnolm LAws Ari. § 76 (1950).
See also § 69(1), specifying the remedies of the "buyer" for breach of w-ranty as
recoupment, action for damages, rejection, or rescission and recovery of the price paid
from -the seller.
173. Subject to the provisions of this act and of any statute in that behalf, there
is no implied warranty or condition as to the quality or fitness for any particular
purpose of goods supplied under a contract to sell or a sale, except as follows: ...
1 Urmno sm LAWs AiN. § 15 (1950).
174. Hanback v. Dutch Baker Boy, Inc., 70 App. D.C. 398, 107 F2d 203 (1939);
Sneed v. Waite, 306 Ky. 587, 208 S.V.2d 749 (1948) (dictum); Smith v. Salem Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 92 N.H. 97, 25 A.2d 125 (1942); cf. Hoback v. Coca Cola Bottling
Works, 20 Tenn. App. 280, 98 SAV.2d 113 (1936).
175. See, e.g., Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 12 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P2d 799 (1939);
Jensen v. Berris, 31 Cal. App. 2d 537, 88 P2d 220 (1939); Nelson v. West Coast
Dairy Co., 5 Wash. 2d 284, 105 P.2d 76 (1940).
176. A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person
who is -in the family or the household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home
if it is reasonable to e.\-pect that such person may use, consume, or be affected by
the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may
not exclude or limit the operation of this section."
U rn xO. CommrmciA. CODE § 2-318 (1958).
The comment of the Commissioners adds, however, that:
Beyond this, the section is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the
developing case law on whether the seller's warranties, given to his buyer who
resells, extend to other persons in the distributive chain."
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its trade name.177 If, as a good many courts have declared, it is these warran-
ties which are to run with the goods to the consumer, -then he must be denied
recovery from, for example, the manufacturer, if the warranties do not arise
on the initial sale to the wholesaler.1 8 And if they do, anything which invali-
dates a contract of sale anywhere along the line may still defeat the recovery,
as in the case of the MIississippi purchaser of a beverage on Sunday. 179
6. Section 49 of the Sales Act further provides that the buyer cannot
recover on a warranty unless he gives notice of its breach to the seller within
a reasonable time after he knows, or ought to know, of the breach.180 As be-
tween the immediate parties to the sale, this is a sound commercial rule, de-
signed to protect the seller against unduly delayed claims for damages. 181 As
applied to personal injuries, and notice to a remote seller, it becomes a booby-
trap for the unwary. The injured consumer is seldom "steeped in the business
practice which justifies the rule,"'1 82 and at least until he has had legal advice
it will not occur to him to give notice to one with whom he has had no deal-
ings. This has given the courts a great deal of trouble; and in order to circum-
vent the statute they have been forced to resort to various devious methods-
either holding that a long delay is "reasonable," 183 or that the provision was
177. (1) Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller
the particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears that the
buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment (whether he be the grower or manu-
facturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably
fit for such purpose.
(2) Where the goods are bought by description from a seller who deals in
goods of that description (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not),
there is an implied warranty that -the goods shall be of merchantable quality.
(3) If the buyer has examined the goods, there is no implied warran~ty aq
regards defects which such examination ought to have revealed.
(4) In the case of a contract to sell or a sale of a specified article under its
patent or other trade name, there is no implied warranty as to its fitness for any
particular purpose.
1 UNIFORm LAws ANN. § 15 (1950).
178. Cf. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Marhenke, 121 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1941), denying
recovery to a child injured by a hot water bag because its father, in purchasing front
the retailer, did not disclose the "particular purpose."
179. Grapico Bottling Co. v. Ennis, 140 Miss. 502, 106 So. 97 (1925).
180. "But, if, after acceptance of the goods, the buyer fail to give notice to the seller
of the breach of any promise or warranty within a reasonable time after the buyer knows,
or ought to know of such breach, the seller shall not be liable therefor." 1A UNWioint
LAws ANN. § 49 (1950).
181. See American Mfg. Co. v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet
Corp., 7 F2d 565, 566 (2d Cir. 1925) (Learned Hand, J.).
182. James, Products Liability, 34 TExAs L. REv. 44, 192, 197 (1955).
183. Bonker v. Ingersoll Prods. Corp., 132 F. Supp. 5 (D. Mass. 1955): Whlitfield
v. Jessup, 31 Cal. 2d 826, 193 P.2d 1 (1948).
1130 [Vol. 69.1099
STRICT LIABILITY TO THE CONSUMER
not intended to apply to personal injuries,18 ' or that it is entirely inapplicable
as between parties who have not dealt with one another.185
7. There is still another trap in Section 69 of the Sales Act, which says
in effect that when the buyer has rescinded the sale to lim, he cannot there-
after maintain an action for damages for breach of warranty.18 0  This has
meant, in Nebraska,s 7 that a buyer who returned a defective pair of shoes
and was given a new pair could not recover from the retailer for personal
injury caused by the shoes. Other courts, however, have not agreed.188
8. Any liability founded upon a warranty is traditionally subject to dis-
claimer by the seller18 9 This means that he is free to insert in his contract
of sale an effective agreement that he does not warrant at all,100 or that he
warrants only against certain consequences or defects,0 1 or that his liability
184. Kennedy v. F. ,V. Woolvorth Co., 205 App. Div. 648, 200 N.Y. Supp. 121 (1923):
Silverstein v. R. H. Macy & Co., 266 App. Div. 5, 40 N.Y.S2d 916 (1943).
Much the greater number of decisions have held to the contrary. Vogel v. Thrifty
Drug Co., 43 Cal. 2d 184, 272 P.2d 1 (1954) ; Ringstad v. I. Magnin & Co., 39 Wash. 2d
923, 239 P.2d 848 (1952); Whitfield v. Jessup, 31 Cal. 2d 826, 193 P2d 1 (1948);
DeLucia v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 139 Conn. 65, 89 A.2d 749 (1952); Idzykowski v.
Jordan Marsh Co., 279 Mass. 163, 181 N.E. 172 (1932) ; Hazelton v. First Nat'l Stores,
Inc., 88 N.H. 409, 190 AtI. 280 (1937) ; Baum v. Murray, 23 Wash. 2d 890, 162 P.2d 801
(1945); Marsh Wood Products Co. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 207 Wis. 209, 240 N.V.
392 (1932) ; Timmins v. F. N. Joslin Co., 303 Mass. 540, 22 N.E.2d 76 (1939) ; Johnson
v. Kanavos, 296 Mass. 373, 6 N.E.2d 434 (1937).
185. La Hue v. Coca-Cola Bottling, Inc., 50 Wash. 2d 645, 314 P2d 421 (1957).
186. "When the buyer has claimed and been granted a remedy in any one of these
ways, no other remedy can thereafter be granted." IA UznioRm LAws Anxz. § 69(2)
(1950).
187. Henry v. Rudge & Guenzel Co., '118 Neb. 260, 224 N.W. 294 (1929); accord:
Geri v. Mistletoe Silks Mills, 80 N.J.L. 128, 76 Atl. 335 (Sup. Ct. 1910); Simmons
-t% Brooks, 66 A2d 517 (D.C. Mun. App. 1949); Stanley Drug Co. v. Smith, Kline &
French Labs., 313 Pa. 368, 170 Atl. 274 (1934) ; Boviard & Seyfang Mfg. Co. v. Maitland,
92 Ohio St. 201, 110 N.E. 749 (1915); Walter-Wallingford Coal Co. v. A. Himes Coal
Co., 223 Mich. 576, 194 N.W. 493 (1923).
188. Russo v. Hochschild Kohn & Co., 184 Aid. 462, 41 A2d 600 (1945); Marko
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 24 N.J. Super. 295, 94 A.2d 348 (App. Div. 1953).
189. James, Products Liability, 34 TE~xAs L. RLv. 44, 192, 210-12 (1955); Wilson,
Products Liability, 43 CALIF. L. Rnv. 614, 809, 835-40 (1955); Prosser, The Implied
Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 Mri. L. REv. 117, 157-67 (1943).
190. Trayler Eng'r & Mfg. Co. v. National Container Corp., 45 Del. (6 Terry)
143, 70 A2d 9 (Super. Ct. 1949); Gibson v. California Spray-Chem. Corp., 9 Wash.
2d 611, 188 P2d 316 (1948) ; S. F. Bowser & Co. v. Independent Dye House, Inc., 276
Mass. 289, 177 N.E. 268 (1931); Rockvood & Co. v. Parrott & Co., 142 Ore. 261, 19
P2d 423 (1933); Valley Refrigeration Co. v. Lange Co., 242 Wis. 466, 8 N.W2d 294
(1943); Burntislandl Shipbuilding Co. v. Barde Steel Products Corp., 278 Fed. 552 (D.
Del. 1922); Morgan v. Williams, 46 Ga. App. 774, 169 S.E. 211 (1933); see also R. .
Brooks Co. v. Storr, 111 N.J.L. 316, 168 At& 382 (Ct Err. & App. 1933) (evidence of vrar-
ranties excluded by parol evidence rule) ; Kimball-Clark Co. v. Crosby, 175 Wis. 337, 185
N.W. 172 (1921).
191. Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Mahon & Robinson, 13 N.D. 516, 101 N.W. 903 (1904)
(warranted "only against breakage"); Minneapolis Threshing Mach. Co. v. Hocking,
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shall be limited to particular remedies, such as replacement, repair or return of
the price.19 2 The courts have done what they could to obviate the dangerous
power which this places in the hands of the seller, either by construing away
the disclaimer,1 93 or by finding that it was not brought home to the buyer,1 4
or in an extreme case by refusing to enforce it as a matter of "natural justice
and good morals."' 95 Nevertheless, the very general use of disclaimers, and
the sanction of the Sales Act,190 make them a factor to be reckoned with; and
54 N.D. 559, 209 N.W. 996 (1926) ; Kolodzcak v. Peerless Motor Co., 255 Mich. 47, 237
N.W. 41 (1931).
192. Sharples Separator Co. v. Domestic Elec. Refrigerator Corp., 61 F.2d 499 (3d
Cir. 1932); Lee v. Pauly Motor Truck Co., 179 Wis. 139, 190 N.W. 819 (1922); Long
v. Ideal Elec. & Mfg. Co., 120 Okla. 63, 250 Pac. 504 (1926); Helvetia Copper Co.
v. Hart-Parr Co., 142 Minn. 74, 171 N.W. 272 (1919); Advance-Rumely Thresher
Co. v. Wharton, 211 Iowa 264, 233 N.W. 673 (1930); Holden v. Advance-Rumely
Thresher Co., 61 N.D. 584, 239 N.W. 479 (1931).
193. Disclaimer not applicable to total "breach of contract," or "failure of consider-
ation:" Myers v. Land, 314 Ky. 514, 235 S.W.2d 988 (1951); International Harvester
Co. v. Bean, 159 Ky. 842, 169 S.W. 549 (1914); Rocky Mountain Seed Co. v. Knorr, 92
Colo. 320, 20 P.2d 304 (1933) ; Smith v. Oscar H. Will & Co., 51 N.D. 357, 199 N.W.
861 (1924) ; Swift & Co. v. Aydlett, 192 N.C. 330, 135 S.E. 141 (1926); Lewitus v. Inde-
pendent Fruit Auction Corp., 128 Misc. 384, 219 N.Y. Supp. 5 (App. Div. 1926).
Disclaimer applicable only to express warranties, not to implied: Bekkevold v. Potts,
173 Mlinn. 87, 216 N.W. 790 (1927) ; Hooven & Allison Co. v. Wirtz Bros., 15 N.D. 477,
107 N.W. 1078 (1906) ; W. F. Main & Co. v. Dearing & Wallace, 73 Ark. 470, 84 S.W.
640 (1905) ; Hardy v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 38 Ga. App. 463, 144 S.E. 327
(1928); Lutz v. Hill-Diesel Engine Co., 255 Mich. 98, 237 N.W. 546 (1931); Liquid
Carbonic Co. v. Coclin, 161 S.C. 40, 159 S.E. 461 (1931); Hughes v. National Equip.
Corp., 216 Iowa 1000, 250 N.W. 154 (1933); McPeak v. Boker, 236 Minn. 420, 53
N.W.2d 130 (1952).
Disclaimer applicable only to personal injuries and not to property damage. Diamond
Shale Co. v. Godwin, 112 S.E.2d 365 (Ga. App. 1959).
Disclaimer does not exclude obligation to deliver a merchantable article according to
the description: W. F. Main & Co. v. El Dorado Dry Goods Co., 83 Ark. 15, 102 S.W.
681 (1907); Meyer v. Packard Cleveland Motor Co., 106 Ohio St. 328, 140 N.E. 118
(1922); United Fig & Date Co. v. Falkenburg, 176 Wash. 122, 28 P2d 287 (1934);
Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954) ; cf. Hall Furniture
Co. v. Crane Breed Mfg. Co., 169 N.C. 41, 85 S.E. 35 (1915).
194. Not effective before contract was completed: Ward v. Valker, 44 N.D. 598, 176
N.W. 129 (1920); Edgar v. Joseph Breck & Sons Corp., 172 Mass. 581, 52 N.E. 1083
(1899) ; Amzi Godden Seed Co. v. Smith, 185 Ala. 296, 64 So. 100 (1913).
Fine print: Woodworth v. Rice Bros. Co., 110 Misc. 158, 179 N.Y. Supp. 722 (Sup.
Ct.), aff'd, 193 App. Div. 971, 184 N.Y. Supp. 958 (1920) ; cf. Federal Motor Truck Sales
Corp. v. Shanus, 190 Minn. 5, 250 N.W. 713 (1933).
Obscure place: Black v. B. B. Kirkland Seed Co., 158 S.C. 112, 155 S.E. 268 (1930)
Linn v. Radio Center Delicatessen, Inc., 169 Misc. 879, 9 N.Y.S.2d 110 (N.Y.C. Munle.
Ct. 1939); Myers v. Land, 314 Ky. 514, 235 S.W.2d 988 (1950).
1.95. Linn v. Radio Center Delicatessen, 169 Misc. 879, 880, 9 N.Y.S.2d 110, 112
(N.Y.C. Munic. Ct. 1939) (food).
196. 1A UNIFORf LAws ANN. § 71 (1950).
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again, if the maker's warranty to the wholesaler fails, the consumer's recov-
ery against the maker fails with it.
Commercially a disclaimer may not be at all an unreasonable thing, particu-
larly where the seller does not know the quality of what he is selling and the
buyer is willing to take his chances. Commercial buyers are usually quite
able to protect themselves. It is another thing entirely to say that the con-
sumer who buiys at retail is to be bound by a disclaimer which lie has never
seen, and to which he would certainly not have agreed if he had known of
it, but which defeats a duty imposed by the policy of the law for his protection.
And if the opportunity is to remain open to the seller to frustrate that policy
completely by the addition of such words as "Not W"rarranted in Any Way"
to the label on the package, it may be expected that there will be those who
will avail themselves of it. It may be predicted with some confidence that
this will not be tolerated. There are still too few cases 197 which have dealt
with the problem to permit any guess as to just what will be done about it;
but at least it remains as a very obvious and a very large hole in the warranty
theory-198
9. If, as has often been said, the warranty runs with the title to the goods,
then it can protect no one who does not acquire the title; and the employee
of the retailer, 9 9 or the friend of the housewife who cuts her hand in a help-
ful attempt to reseal a glass jar,200 cannot recover. It may very well be that
we are not yet ready, and may never be ready, to extend the strict liability to
such people;201 but if the time is to come when the courts are ready for it, they
have laid up trouble in heaven.
What all of this adds up to is that "warranty," as a device for the justification
of strict liability to the consumer, carries far too much luggage in the way of
undesirable complications, and is leading us down a very thorny path. The
197. See Jolly v. C. E. Blackwell & Co., 122 Wash. 620, 624, 211 Pac. 748, 750
(1922) ("since a specific warranty as to personal property cannot run with the thing
itself, we see no reason why a disclaimer of warranty should run with the thing");
cf. Sokoloski v. Splann, 311 Mass. 203, 40 N.E.2d 874 (1942).
In Linn v. Radio Center Delicatessen, Inc., 169 Misc. 879, 9 N.Y.S2d 110 (N.Y.C.
Aunic. Ct 1939), the manufacturer's disclaimer on the sale of food Nas held to be
ineffective against the consumer, as against natural justice and good morals. Contra,
Rockwood & Co., v. Parrott & Co., 142 Ore. 261, 19 P2d 423 (1933). In Chimplin
v. Oklahoma Furniture Mfg. Co., 269 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1959), and Ebers v. General
Chem. Co., 310 Mich. 261, 17 NAV.2d 176 (1945), it was held that the disclaimer
could not affect the manufacturer's liability to the consumer for negligence. See also
American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Frey, 127 La. 183, 53 So. 486 (1910).
198. DicKERsoN, PRonucrs Li~nAIrr AND THE FooD CONstMR, 97-93 (1951), re-
gards this as one of the greatest weaknesses of the w\arranty theory.
199. Jax Beer Co. v. Schaeffer, 173 SAV2d 285 (Tem. Civ. Ct. App. 1943).
200. Torpey v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 228 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1955); accord, Loch
v. Confair, 361 Pa. 158, 63 A.2d 24 (1949) (prospective purchaser lmndling bottle in self-
service store); cf. Lasky v. Economy Grocery Stores, 319 Mass. 224, 65 N.E2d 305
(1946); Day v. Grand Union Co., 280 App. Div. 253, 113 N.Y.S2d 436 (1952).
201. See text at note 261 infra.
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courts which quote, in nearly every other case, the statement that "the remedies
of injured consumers ought not to be made to depend upon the intricacies
of the law of sales," 20 2 have proceeded to entangle themselves in precisely
those intricacies like Laoco6n and his sons.
All this is pernicious and entirely unnecessary. No one doubts that, unless
there is privity, liability to the consumer must be in tort and not in contract.
There is no need to borrow a concept from the contract law of sales; and it
is "only by some violent pounding and twisting" 203 that "warranty" can be
made to serve the purpose at all. Why talk of it? If there is to be strict liability
in tort, let there be strict liability in tort, declared outright, without an illusory
contract mask. Such strict liability is familiar enough in the law of animals, ab-
normally dangerous activities, nuisance, workmen's compensation, and respon-
deat superior. There is nothing so shocking about it today that cannot be accepted
and stand on its own feet in this new and additional field, provided always
that public sentiment, public demand, and "public policy" have reached the
point where the change is called for. There are not lacking indications that
some of the courts are about ready to throw away the crutch, and to admit
what they are really doing, when they say that the warranty is not the one
made on the original sale, and does not run with the goods, but is a new
and independent one made directly to the consumer ;204 and that it does not
arise out of or depend upon any contract, but is imposed by the law, in tort,
as a matter of policy.20 5
EXPRESS LANGUAGE
If the seller makes specific representations to the public concerning the
quality of his wares, they may provide a different basis for strict liability
to the consumer, which escapes the privity requirement. 200 The older cases,
202. Ketterer v. Armour & Co., 200 Fed. 322, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1912).
203. Patterson, The Apportionment of Business Risks Through Legal Devices, 24
COLUm. L. REv. 335, 358 (1924).
204. Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 90 S.W.2d
445 (1936) ; Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953) ; Markovich v. McKesson
& Robbins, Inc., 106 Ohio App. 265, 149 N.E2d 181 (1958) ; Worley v. Procter & Gamble
Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (1952) (dictum); Le Blanc v. Louisiana
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 221 La. 919, 60 So. 2d 873 (1952) ; B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Hain-
mond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959).
205. Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc., v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942);
Griggs Canning Co. v. Josey, 139 Tex. 623, 164 S.W.2d 835 (1942) : La Hue v. Coca-Cola
Bottling, Inc., 50 Wash. 2d 645, 314 P.2d 421 (1957); Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc., 176
Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954) ; Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cathey, 83 Ariz. 163,
317 P.2d 1094 ('1957); Patargias v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 332 Ill. App. 117, 74 N.E.2d
162 (1947).
206. See Feezer, Manufacturer's Liability for Injuries Caused by His Products: De-
fective Automobiles, 37 Micnr. L. REv. 1 (1938); Jeanblanc, Manufacturers" Liability to
Person.s Other Than Their Immediate Vendees, 24 VA. L. REV. 134, 145, 157 (1937) ; Noel,
Manufacturers of Products-The Drift Toward Strict Liability, 24 TENN. L. REv. 963,
999-1009 (1957); Note, 46 HARv. L. REV. 161 (1932); 81 U. PA. L. REv. 94 (1932); 18
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in general, refused to accept any such idea,-07 although it was recognized that
an intentional misrepresentation was a basis for an action of deceit s8 and that
a negligent one would support an ordinary negligence action for personal
injuries. 20 9 As long ago as 1891, however, the Pennsylvania court,2-10 relying
upon the usages of -trade, held that an express warranty on a tobacco tag
inured to the benefit of a remote purchaser. The first major recognition of
strict liability came, however, in 1934, when the Washington case of Baxter
v. Ford Motor Co.21" held that a statement, in the literature distributed by
the maker of an automobile, that the glass in its windshield was "shatter-
proof" made it liable, without scienter or negligence, to one who bought the
car from a dealer and was injured when a pebble struck the glass and shattered
it.
This decision has been followed; and there are now some thirteen juris-
dictions which have accepted the strict liability for statements that prove in
fact to be false, when they are made to the public in labels on the goods
themselves, 212 or in the seller's advertising 2 8 or his disseminated litera-
CoRNsr. L.Q. 445 (1933); 22 WVAsH. U.L.Q. 406 (1937). In violent opposition to the
whole matter is Leidy, Another New Tort? 38 Micn. L. REv. 964 (1940).
207. See, e.g., Newhall v. Ward Baking Co., 240 Mass. 434, 134 N.E. 625 (1922);
Alpine v. Friend Bros., Inc., 244 Mass. 164, 138 N.E 553 (1923).
208. Langridge v. Levy, 2 M. & W. 519, 150 Eng. Rep. 863 (1837).
209. Crist v. Art Metal Works, 230 App. Div. 114,243 N.Y. Supp. 496 (1930) ; Lehner
v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 206 Misc. 1103, 136 N.Y.S.2d 121 (N.Y.C. City Ct. 1954).
210. Conestoga Cigar Co. v. Finke, 144 Pa. St. 159, 22 At. 868 (1891).
211. 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409, affd per curiam on rehearing, 15 P2d 1118 (1932),
aff'd on second appeal, 179 Wash. 123, 35 P.2d 1090 (1934).
212. Conestoga Cigar Co. v. Finke, 144 Pa. St. 159, 22 Atl. 868 (1891) (tag on tobac-
co) ; Darks v. Scudders-Gale Grocer Co., 146 Mo. App. 246, 130 S.,V. 430 (1910) (ginger
extract) ; Graham v. John R. Watts & Son, 238 Ky. 96, 36 S.V2d 859 (1931) (seed);
Simpson v. American Oil Co., 217 N.C. 542, 8 S.F_2d 813 (1940) (insecticide); Free v.
Sluss, 87 Cal. App. 2d 933, 197 P.2d 854 (Dist. Ct. App. 1948) (detergent); Davis Y.
Radford, 233 N.C. 283, 63 S.E.2d 822 (1951) (dictum) (salt substitute) ; Randall v. Good-
rich-Gamble Co., 238 Minn. 10, 54 N.V.2d 769 (1952) (dictum) (liniment); Worley
v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.,V.2d 532 (1952) (washing
powder); Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co., 63 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1953) (%watermelon seed);
Lane v. C. A. Swanson & Sons, 130 Cal. App. 2d 272, 278 P.2d 723 (Dist. CL App. 1955)
("boned chicken"); Bonker v. Ingersoll Products Corp., 132 F. Supp. 5 (D. Mass.
1955) ("boneless chicken fricasee"; Pennsylvania law); Maecherlein v. Sealy Mattress
Co., 145 Cal. App. 2d 275, 302 P.2d 331 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956) (mattress; plaintiff stabkd
by a spring in her "gluteal prominence").
213. Laclede Steel Co. v. Silas Mason Co. 67 F. Supp. 751 (V.D. La. 1946) (scrap
metal); Lane v% ,C. A. Swanson & Sons, 130 Cal. App. 2d 272, 278 P2d 723 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1955) ("boned chicken"); Maecherlein v. Sealy Mattress Co., 145 Cal. App.
2d 275, 302 P2d 331 (Dist. Ct App. 1956) (mattress) ; Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent
Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E2d 612 (1958) (home permanent wave solution);
Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 106 Ohio App. 265, 149 N.E.2d 181 (1958) (same) ;
Arfons v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 261 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1958) (dynamite;
Ohio law).
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ture,214 and it can be found that the plaintiff relied upon such statements in
making his purchase. Since the basis of this liability does not turn upon the
character of the goods, but upon the representation, such decisions have not
been confined to food, and have ranged over a variety of other commodities
such as cosmetics, detergents, insecticides, automobiles, scrap metal, wire rope,
dynamite, and a mattress.219 After the Baxter case in 1934, decisions to the
contrary have been amazingly few,21 6 and this branch of the strict liability
appears by now to be well established.
Its limitations are also fairly dear. There must be something which is
reasonably to be understood as a positive assertion of fact, which covers the
injurious defect.2 17 The assertion must be made by the defendant,218 and it
must be addressed to the public,2 1 9 or at least intended to be passed on to
the particular plaintiff,220 and he can recover only if he does in fact learn of
214. Timberland Lumber Co. v. Climax Mfg. Co., 61 F2d 391 (3d Cir. 1932) (loco-
motive, with "guarantee" to be passed on to purchaser by the dealer); Baxter v. Ford
Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409, 15 P.2d 1118 (1934), aff'd on second appeal, 179
Wash. '123, 35 P.2d 1090 (1934) (glass in automobile windshield, catalogues); Bahlman
v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939) (safety of steel top of
automobile, distributed literature); Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir.
1946) (dictum) (wire rope, manufacturer's manual); Studebaker Corp. v. Nail, 82 Ga.
App. 779, 62 S.E2d 198 (1950) ("service policy" on automobile, distributed to purchasers) ;
Arfons v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 261 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1958) (dynamite, Ohio
law) ; Hansen v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 276 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1960) (brochure
accompanying tire); cf. Ein v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 173 F. Supp. 497 (D. Ind.
1959) (tire, method not specified).
215. See cases cited in notes 212-14 supra.
216. The only two found are Chanin v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 89 F.2d 889 (7th Cir.
1937), and Rachlin v. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 96 F.2d 597 (2d Cir. 1938), both re-
jecting the Baxter case on similar facts. Jordon v. Brouwer, 86 Ohio App. 505, 93 N.E.2d
49 (1949), which denied recovery for labels on cans of anti-freeze solution, is overruled
by Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E2d 612 (1958).
217. Thus "pure... and nutritious" was held not to cover a nail in a loaf of bread
in Newhall v. Ward Baking Co., 240 Mass. 434, 134 N.E. 625 (1922) and in Murphy
v. Plymouth Motor Corp., 3 Wash. 2d 180, 100 P2d 30 (1940), pictures of an automobile
being turned over at sixty miles an hour and of a freight car resting on top of it, as well
as descriptions of safety glass, were held to state nothing that was actually false. Cf.
Alpine v. Friend Bros., 244 Mass. 164, 138 N.E. 553 (1923); Lambert v. Sistrunk, 58
So. 2d 434 (Fla. 1952). Compare Jones v. Raney Chevrolet Co., 213 N.C. 775, 197
S.E. 757 (1938).
218. Thus the wholesaler was held not to have adopted the maker's warranty in Cochran
v. McDonald, 23 Wash. 2d. 348, 161 P.2d 305 (1945).
219. Express warranties to individuals were held not to extend to third persons.
Senter v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 127 F. Supp. 705 (D. Colo. 1954) ; Silverman v. Samuel
Mallinger Co., 375 Pa. 422, 100 A.2d 715 (1953) ; Hermanson v. Hermanson, 19 Conn.
Supp. 479, 117 A.2d 840 (1954) ; Pearl v. William Filene's Sons Co., 317 Mass. 529, 58
N.E.2d 825 (1945); Barni v. Kutner, 45 Del. (6 Terry) 550, 76 A.2d 801 (Super. Ct.
1950); Turner v. Edison Storage Battery Co., 248 N.Y. 73, 161 N.E. 423 (1928) (war.
ranty theory held to require privity). In all of these cases, however, the plaintiff never
knew of the representation and did not rely upon it.
220. Cf. Jeffery v. Hanson, 39 Wash. 2d 855, 239 P.2d 346 (1952) (tractor); Lindroth
v. Walgreen Co., 329 Ill. App. 105, 67 N.E.2d 595 (1946) (vaporizer).
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it, and is injured as a result of his reliance upon it.221 The Washington court,
which started the whole development, has just refused to apply the principle
to permit recovery for pecuniary loss due to a defect in a truck which led to
excessive consumption of gasoline and oil, and has said that it is limited to
cases "where the thing causing the injury is of a noxious or dangerous
kind." 222
Here again the legal theory which has emerged in the cases is that of a
"warranty," made directly to the consumer by means of the express repre-
sentation. Again, however, "warranty" would appear to be no unmixed bless-
ing. Nearly all of the difficulties and objections which plague the implied
warranty 22 arise with equal force against the express. Again the liability
must dearly be in tort and not in contract, and there is not only no need to
borrow a contract term from the law of sales, but it is fraught with trouble
when it is employed. In the second appeal in the Baxter case, - 2 4 the court
discarded the theory of warranty in favor of one of deceit, which wms applied
notwithstanding the innocence of the misrepresentation, and the absence of
either scienter or negligence. This comes much closer to the basic idea of de-
ception which underlies these decisions; and it is quite consistent with the
rule which has developed in at least thirteen jurisdictions,2 5 that deceit will
221. Randall v. Goodrich-Gamble Co., 238 Minn. 10, 54 N.W.2d 769 (1952); Dubbin
v. Pacific Coast Coal Co., 25 Wash. 2d 190, 170 P2d 642 (1946); see cases cited in note
211 supra.
222. Dimoff v. Ernie Majer, Inc., 347 P.2d 1056 (Wash. 1960).
223. See text at notes 167-201 supra.
224. . . . since it was the duty of appellant to know that the representations made
to purchasers were true. Otherwise it should not have made them. If a person
states as true material facts susceptible of knowledge to one who relies and acts
thereon to his injury, if the representations are false, it is immaterial that he did
not know they were false, or that he believed them to be true. . . . The court
charged the jury that "there is no proof of fraud in this case." It has become
almost axiomatic that false representations inducing a sale or contract constitute
fraud in law.
Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 179 Wash. 123, 128, 35 P.2d 1090, 1092 (1934).
225. Stein v. Treger, 182 F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Cartwright v. Braly, 218 Ala.
49, 117 So. 477 (1928) (dictum); Launing v. Sprague, 71. Idaho 138, 227 P.2d 347
(1951) (dictum); Romine v. Thayer, 74 Ind. App>. 536, 128 N.E. 456 (1920); Becker
v. McKinnie, 106 Kan. 426, 186 Pac. 496 (1920) ; New England Foundation Co. v. Elliott
A. Watrous, Inc., 306 Mass. 177, 27 N.E.2d 756 (1940); Essenburg v. Russell, 346 Mich.
319, 78 N.W.2d 136 (1956); Moulton v. Norton, 184 Minn. 343, 238 N.W. 686 (1931) ;
Paul v. Cameron, 127 Neb. 510, 256 N.W. 11 (1934) ; Ham v. Hart, 58 N.M. 550, 273
P.2d 748 (1954); Wilson v. Jones, 45 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. Comm. App. 1932); Trust C.
of Norfolk v. Fletcher, 152 Va. 868, 148 S.E. 785 (1929) ; Jacquot v. Farmers' Straw
Gas Producer Co., 140 Wash. 482, 249 Pac. 984 (1926).
There are cases in four other jurisdictions which look like this, although the law is
not dear. Chitty v. Home-Wilson, Inc., 92 Ga. App. 716, 89 S.E.2d 816 (1955) ; Tott
v. Duggan, 199 Iowa 238, 200 N.W. 411 (1924); Horton v. Tyree, 104 NV. Va. 230, 139
S.E. 737 (1927); First Nal Bank of Tigerton v. Hecht, 159 Wis. 113, 149 N.W. 703
(1914).
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lie for an entirely innocent misrepresentation made in a sale, rental or ex-
change transaction. It may at least afford a convenient 'bolt-hole for any court
that finds itself bottled up in the complications of warranty; and sooner or
later the courts may be expected to recognize that, without any idea of contract,
the liability is one in tort, for an innocent misrepresentation.
Thus stands the battle today. What, then, of the future? To what may we
look forward in the next ten, twenty, or even fifty years?
WHAT PRODUTS ?
Express representations to the public may of course cover any product. In
the absence of express language, it is thus far still true that "the emotional
drive and appeal of the cases centers in the stomach. ' ' 220 It can scarcely be
doubted, in the light of the current decisions,227 that the fight over food pro-
ducts will speedily be won by the plaintiff. There remains, however, an
astonishing little argument over whether the "warranty" of food includes the
safety of the container in which it is sold. Cases in California,228 Oklahoma, -"2
and Texas 2 30 have held that it does not, while Florida,23 oa Kansas,231 Louisi-
ana,232 and Ohio 233 have disagreed. This metaphysical distinction between the
container and -the contents can only be regarded as amazing. The two are sold
by each seller, and received by the ultimate purchaser, as an integrated whole;
and where the action is against the immediate seller, it is well settled that the
warranty covers both.3 4 One can only surmise that the courts which make the
distinction have been disturbed by an uneasy uncertainty as to whether, despite
the evidence, the plaintiff may not have tried to open the bottle by banging it
on the radiator. Suppose that a bottle of Coca Cola explodes, and cuts the
plaintiff's wrist-is recovery really to turn on whether the explosion is due to
a flaw in the glass or to an overcharged beverage?235
226. LLEVELLYx, CASES ON SALES 342 (1930).
227. See cases cited notes 47-68 supra.
228. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944); Gerber
v. Faber, 54 Cal. App. 2d 674, 129 P.2d 485 (Dist. Ct. App. 1942).
229. Soter v. Griesedieck W. Brewery Co., 200 Okla. 302, 193 P.2d 575 (1948);
McAlester Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Lynch, 280 P.2d 466 (Okla. 1955).
230. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Butler, 180 S.W.2d 996 (Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1944);
Latham v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 175 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1943).
See also Jax Beer Co. v. Schaeffer, 173 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1943), and
Torpey v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 228 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1955), where the injury was not
to a consumer.
230a. Canada Dry Bottling -Co. v. Shaw, 118 So. 2d 840 (Fla. App. 1960).
231. Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953).
232. Johnson v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 63 So. 2d 459, 463 (La. 1953).
233. Mahoney v. Shaker Square Beverages, Inc., 102 N.E.2d 281 (Ohio C.P. 1951).
234. Morelli v. Fitch, [1928] 2 K.B. 636; Geddling v. Marsh, [1920] 1 K.B. 668;
Naumann v. Wehle Brewing Co., 127 Conn. 44, 15 A.2d 181 (1940); Mead v. Coca
Cola Bottling Co., 329 Mass. 440, 108 N.E2d 757 (1952) ; Poulos v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co., 322 Mass. 386, 77 N.E.2d 405 (1948).
235. Yet this distinction appears actually to be suggested in McIntyre v. Kansas
City Coca Cola Bottling Co., 85 F. Supp. 708 (W.D. Mo. 1949).
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There are, surprisingly enough, no cases on drugsi" except for one very
important one involving poliomyelitis vaccine which is now on its way up in
California.2-3 Drugs always have gone along with food,m 8 and in general it is
to be expected that well known and standardized pharmacopceia products, such
as Epsom salts and aspirin, will continue to do so. It seems obvious, however,
that there will be cases of new, experimental or uncertain drugs which will
present special problems, and to which the courts may hesitate to apply
any such broad rule. The extension of strict liability to other products
for intimate bodily use, such as cosmetics, is already under way,3 and the
prediction may be ventured with some confidence that within the next few
years it will reach clothing. "No sound distinction can probably be logically
drawn between a noxious thing taken internally, and wearing apparel, con-
taining a poisonous dye, meant -to be worn next to the skin."240
When we come to other products, not intended for such bodily use, one
may speculate that, notwithstanding the spectacular eruption of recent
decisions, 2 1 expansion of the strict liability of the seller is likely to
proceed more slowly. There is not the same emotional drive and public de-
mand-it is still the glass in the loaf of bread and the cockroach in the bottle
of beer that arouses the utmost popular indignation. Furthermore, the pro-
ducts themselves differ in many respects from food, and vary widely. In a
thoughtful article,2 42 Dean Green has pointed out that "mechanical products,"
of which the automobile is doubtless typical, are expected to be used over a
period of years, rather than consumed once; that the user is likely to be mure
or less experienced, and so able to some extent to protect himself; that such
products frequently are assembled, inspected, tested or serviced by intermediate
dealers before they reach the consumer; and that "there is no such thing as a
mechanical product safe for very long in the hands of some one who docs not
know how to use it." Also that the use made of the thing is largely a matter
236. Unless -the salt substitute in Davis v. Radford, 233 N.C. 233, 63 S.E.2d 8-"
(1951), is to be regarded as a drug.
237. Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, District Court of Appeal of California,
First Appellate District, 1 Civil No. 18413 (1959). The case raises a number of inter-
esting and difficult questions concerning strict liability, on which it would not be proper
for the writer now to comment The problem is discussed in Note, 65 YALE L.J. 262
(1955).
23& E.g., Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852); Blood Balm
Co. v. Cooper, 83 Ga. 457, 10 S.E. 118 (1889); cf. Norton v. Sewall, 105 Mass. 143, 8
Am. Rep.298 (1870).
239. See cases cited notes 99-102,vupra. "Logic will permit no distinction in this regard
between articles to be consumed by the human body internally and those to be absorkd
by it externally. The law should be no less solicitous of the outside of man than of his
inside." Higbee v. Giant Food Shopping Center, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 586, 587-88 (ED.
Va. 1952).
240. Barrett v. S. S. Kresge Co., 144 Pa. Super. 516, 520, 19 A.2d 502, 503 (1941).
241. See cases cited notes 107-16 stpra.
242. Green, Should the Mmfacturer of General Products Be Liable Without Ncgli-
gence?, 24 TENN. L. Ry. 928, 933 (1957).
19601 1139
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
of the plaintiff's own testimony, against which the defendant may be quite
helpless.
There is the further objection, that a good many such products are still not
far beyond the experimental stage, or may have defects that cannot be dis-
covered or prevented by any methods as yet known to the producers. Pro-
fessor Plant 243 calls attention to a Michigan case 244 in which the maker
of an airplane incorporated in its engine a connecting rod made by another
company, which was unduly subject to metal fatigue because of "inclusion
pits" due to nonmetallic matter in the steel; and these pits could not be de-
tected by the test prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Administration, or by
any other test of whose existence there was any evidence in the case. The
courts may well be reluctant to saddle a still-developing industry with the
heavy burden of responsibility for plane crashes due to such causes.
Nevertheless, an unbiased observer who has followed the whole sweep and
progress of the law of the last half century will not conclude that strict
liability is destined to stop short with articles for bodily use. The public
interest in the safety of products which the public must buy certainly extends
to a great many other things. The wedge has entered, and we are on our way.
One may speculate that there will be initial slow expansion into two fields.
One is that of high potential peril,2 5 where products such as firearms and
dynamite were classed, in the early days of negligence liability, as "inherently
dangerous." The other involves what might be called standardized products,
such as razor blades and automobile tires,240 where there is uniformity of
production methods and quality, and a 'high degree of safety already has been
achieved, so that purchasers feel that they receive, and are entitled to receive,
an assurance of such safety. Ultimately, after many such accretions, we may
arrive at a "general rule" of strict liability for all products, with certain
specified exceptions; but these things are still of the uncertain and indefinite
future.
WHAT SELLERS?
In all of the cases in which strict liability has been accepted and applied,
the defendant -has been engaged in the business of selling goods of the par-
ticular kind. So far as can be discovered, the question has not even been
raised as to whether the rule might apply to one who is not so engaged. One
may predict with assurance that it will not. The housewife who sells a jar
of jam to her neighbor, or the owner of a used car who trades it in to a dealer,
243. Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in Pro-
ducts-An Opposing View, 24 TExw. L. REV. 938 (1957).
244. Livesley v. Continental Motors Corp., 331 Mich. 434, 49 N.W2d 365 (1951).
245. Cf. Chapman Chem. Co. v. Taylor, 215 Ark. 650, 222 S.W.2d 820 (1949) (crop
dusting chemical, likely to drift). Contra, Green v. Equitable Powder Mfg. Co., 94 F.
Supp. 126 (W.D. Ark. 1950) (dynamite).
246. It should be noted that the cases cited in notes 107-13 supra, all fall in this
category.
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will obviously stand on a very different footing so far as the justifiable expec-
tations of third parties are concerned.
All of the courts which have accepted strict liability agree that it applies
to the manufacturer of the product. There is also general agreement, except
perhaps in two or three states,247 that it applies to the retailer. There is,
however, a somewhat baffling dispute as to the wholesaler. In Mississippi, - 8
Missouri 2 49 and Texasas ° it has been held that he is not liable on any "wrar-
ranty" to the consumer. The opinions have endeavored to justify the con-
clusion by stressing the lack of privity, the wholesaler's inability to discover
the defect, and the absence of any reliance upon his skill or judgment. There
are decisions to the contrary in Kansas2 51 and Washington,2 52 and dicta in
Florida 253 and North Carolina.25 4
Surely all of the valid arguments supporting strict liability-the public
interest in the utmost safety of products, the demand for the maximum pro-
tection of the consumer, the implied assurance in placing the goods upon
the market for human use, the consumer's reliance upon the apparent safety
of a thing that he finds upon the market because the defendant has put it
there, the fact that the consumer is the seller's ultimate objective, the desir-
ability of avoiding circuity of action and allowing recovery directly against
earlier sellers 25---all of these apply with no less force against the wholesaler.
247. Mississippi rejects the warranty on a direct sale to the plaintiff by the retailer.
Kroger Grocery Co. v. Lewelling, 165 Miss. 71, 145 So. 726 (1933). It also rejects the
wholesaler's warranty. Elmore v. Grenada Grocery Co., 189 Miss. 370, 197 So. 761 (1940).
It may be assumed that it rejects the retailer's warranty to a third party.
Missouri rejects the wholesaler's warranty. Degouveia v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co.,
231 Mo. App. 447, 100 SV.2d 336 (1936). The federal court has taken this to mean
that the retailer's warranty does not extend to third persons. See Conner v. Great Atl.
& Pac. Tea Co., 25 F. Supp. 855 (W.D. Mo. 1939) ; McIntyre v. Kansas City Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 85 F. Supp. 708 (W.D. Mo. 1949) (dictum). But this conclusion in turn
was rejected in Williams v. Campbell Soup Co., 80 F. Supp. 865 (W.D. Mo. 1948).
Virginia rejected the retailer's warranty to a third party in Colonna v. Rosedale Dairy
Co., 166 Va. 314, 186 S.E. 94 (1936). Doubt is cast upon the case, however, by Swift
& Co. v. Wells, 201 Va. 213, 110 S.E.2d 203 (1959).
248. Elmore v. Grenada Grocery Co., 189 Miss. 370, 197 So. 761 (1940).
249. Degouveia v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 231 Mo. App. 447, 100 S.W.2d 336
(1936).
250. Bowman Biscuit Co. v. Hines, 151 Tex. 370, 251 S.W.2d 153 (1952) (a 5-4
decision after rehearing) ; Jax Beer Co. v. Schaeffer, 173 S.W2d 295 (Te-. Civ. Ct. App.
1943). See Comment, Implied Warranties of Quality fit Texas Sales, 32 TsxAs L Rxv.
557, 566-68 (1954) ; Note, 31 TmcAs L. Rn-v. 594 (1953) ; Note, 10 VAsHr. & Lra L. Rzw.
255 (1953); Note, 1953 WAsH. U.L.Q. 327.
251. Swengel v. F. & E. Wholesale Grocery Co., 147 Kan. 555, 77 P.2d 930 (1938);
Challis v. Hartloff, 136 Kan. 823, 18 P.2d 199 (1933) ; Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258
P.2d 317 (1953); Graham v. Bottenfied's, Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954).
252. Nelson v. West Coast Dairy Co., 5 Wash. 2d 284, 105 P2d 76 (1940).
253. See Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co., 63 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1953).
254. See Davis v. Radford, 233 N.C. 283, 63 S.E2d 822 (1951).
255. See text at notes 149-51 supra.
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If -the retailer is to be held to strict liability to one who never has heard his
name, the wholesaler has no better claim to immunity. And when, as is now
often the case, the large wholesale supply house is actually the prime mover
in marketing the goods, and the manufacturer only a small concern which
feeds it, there is no reason whatever to single out this one seller in the chain
for an exception. These decisions would appear to be mere temporary aber-
rations, which in the long run will not be followed.
WHAT PLAINTIFFS?
No one has yet recovered for personal injuries, on the basis of strict
liability without privity, who could not fairly be called a consumer. A customer
in a beauty shop has recovered when her hair was treated with the defendant's
dye,256 and so has a housewife who contracted tularemia while preparing
rabbits for cooking.257 Members of the family of the final purchaser, 58 and
his guests 259 and donees,2 0 who consume or use the product have been pro-
tected. The case of 'his employee has not yet turned up, but there can be no
doubt that he will be included. But others who have come in contact with the
product and been injured 'by it, without consumption or use, have been denied
recovery.261
Unquestionably the "emotional drive" and the public demand that has
sprung from it have centered in the consumer. There may be no very logical
reason why the seller should not assume strict responsibility to such casual
bystanders, other than the fact that they are not the people whom he seeks
to reach with his goods, and so they do not 'have the same reason to rely
upon any implied assurance of safety. It may, however, be expected that any
extension to the nonconsumer will be slow; and it may perhaps never come.
Strict liability also has been applied to permit the retailer to recover from
256. Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954).
257. Haut v. Kleene, 320 Ill. App. 273, 50 N.E2d 855 (1943).
258. Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W2d 828 (1942);
Griggs Canning Co. v. Josey, 139 Tex. 623, 164 S.W.2d 835 (1942) (husband recovers
for injury to wife who was final purchaser) ; Swengel v. F. & E. Wholesale Grocery Co.,
147 Kan. 555, 77 P.2d 930 (1938) ;,Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P2d 317 (1953);
Swift & Co. v. Wells, 201 Va. 213, 110 S.E.2d 203 (1959); Blanton v. Cudahy Packing
Co., 154 Fla. 872, 19 So.2d 313 (1944); Welter v. Bowman Dairy Co., 318 Ill. App. 305,
47 N.E2d 739 (1943) ; ,Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382
(1920).
259. Miller v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 70 So.2d 409 (La. Ct. App. 1954);
Welch v. Schiebelhuth, 11 Misc. 2d 312, 169 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
260. Coda-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927); Klein
v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cta 2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939);.Nefnela v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 104 S.W.2d 773 (Mo. Ct. App. 1937) (dictum); Blarjeske v. Thompson's
Restaurant Co., 325 IIl. App. 189, 59 N.E2d 320 (1945) (dictum).
261. Jax Beer Co. v. Schaeffer, 173 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1943) (retailer's
employee); Loch v. Confair, 361 Pa. 158, 63 A2d 24 (1949) (shopper in self-service
store) ; Torpey v. Red Owl Stores, 129 F. Supp. 404 (D. Minn. 1955) (friend resealing
jar at request of purchaser).
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the manufacturer for his pecuniary loss when indignant customers return the
goods and spread the word.2 62 This is, of course, not far removed from
indemnity, and indicates again the policy of making each seller in the chain of
distribution liable to all those whom, in ordinary course, the product is to
reach.
WHAT DAMAGE?
All but a few of the cases have involved personal injuries; and the plain-
tiff has recovered for all of the usual elements of damage, including the physical
consequences of mental disturbance.20n Damage to property has been slow
to appear, for the obvious reason that nearly all of the products thus far in-
volved have been those intended for bodily use. There is no sensible reason
for distinguishing between the two kinds of damage; and the question would
appear to be rather one of choosing the products to be covered by the strict
liability. If it is to be extended to include products likely to cause only
property damage, cases of such damage may be expected to put in their ap-
pearance, and to be decided for the plaintiff. There are already four, -
and they are supported, in principle at least, by the cases of recovery for
pecuniary loss. 265
A more difficult problem is that of what Professor Ehrenzweig has called
"typicality" of the injury. Put in more ordinary language, this means the
foreseeability of the harm-the seller's reasonable anticipation of it as a normal
consequence of the consumption or use of his product if it should turn out to
be defective. It is the sort of issue that is likely to be buried under the name
of "proximate cause." There has been virtually no consideration of this prob-
lem 266 in the cases with which we are dealing, undoubtedly because food
262. Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913); Southwest Ice
& Dairy Prods. Co. v. Faulkenberry, 203 Okla. 279, 220 P.2d 257 (1950). See note 2,5
infra.
263. Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939) ; Dryden v.
Continental Baking Co., 11 Cal. 2d 33, 77 P2d 833 (1938).
264. In McAfee v. Cargill, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Cal. 1954), and Midwest Game
Co. v. M.F.A. Milling Co., 320 S.\V.2d 547 (Mo. 1959), recovery was allowed for the loss
of dogs and fish respectively caused by defective animal food.
In Spence v. Three Rivers (Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.V2d
873 (1958), the purchaser of cinder building blocks recovered from the manufacturer when
he used them to build a house and it cracked.
In Gladiola Biscuit Co. v. Southern Ice Co., 267 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1959), reversing 163
F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Tex. 1958), a manufacturer of biscuits recovered for the loss of a
batch of dough when the defendant's ice, used to mix it, turned out to be full of glass.
265. See cases cited note 252 .rupra. See also Continental Copper & Steel Indus., Inc.
v. E. C. "Red" Cornelius, Inc., 104 So.2d 40 (Fla. Ct. App. 1958), where the plaintiff
recovered for pecuniary loss on the purchase of a defective electric cable; and the dictum
in Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co., 63 So2d 514 (Fla. 1953), as to the loss on a crop of
watermelons. Contra, as to express language, Dimoff v. Ernie Majer, Inc., 347 P.2d 1056
(Wash. 1960).
266. Exceptions are Mannsz v. Mfacwhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946), where
an express warranty of wire rope was held not to cover its use in a manner not to be
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poisoning is such an obvious result of bad food. We are thrown back upon
two reasonably close analogies: the direct warranty from the retailer to his
purchaser, and the negligence action against the manufacturer. Both offer
a good many cases.
It is clear initially that the seller is entitled to expect a normal use of his
product, and that he is not to be held liable when it is mishandled 207 or used
in some unusual and unforeseeable way,268 as when nail polish is set on fire,200
or cleaning fluid is splashed into the eye 270 or mixed with another chemical, 2 1
or an obstinate lady insists upon wearing shoes that do not fit.27 2 It is gener-
ally agreed that the seller of pork infested with trichinae can at least expect
the meat to be cooked,2 73 although there are decisions which have allowed
recovery when it was cooked to the extent that the plaintiff erroneously thought
sufficient.274
Again, it is clear that the seller may expect, within some reasonable limits,
that the product will be used by normal persons, and that he will not be held
responsible when some idiosyncracy peculiar to the plaintiff makes him ab-
normally sensitive to a product quite harmless to ordinary people.27 This must
expected, and Worley v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d
532 (1952), as to allergy of the consumer.
267. Gilbride v. James Leffel & Co., 47 N.E.2d 1015 (Ohio Ct. App. 1942) (oper-
ation of a boiler) ; Walton v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 191 F.2d 277 (8th Cir. 1951) (crop
dusting) ; Waterman v. Liederman, 16 Cal. App. 2d 483, 60 P.2d 881, hearing denied, 62
P2d 142 (1936) (highly dangerous driving on tire); Hickert v. Wright, 182 Kan. 100,
319 P.2d 152 (1957) (same).
268. A normal use may, however, include such things as standing on a chair. Phillips
v. Ogle Aluminum Furniture, Inc., 106 Cal. App. 2d 650, 235 P.2d 857 (Dist. Ct. App.
1951) ; cf. Ringstad v. I. Magnin & Co., 39 Wash. 2d 923, 239 P.2d 848 (1952) (wearing
cocktail robe in proximity to kitchen stove); Martin v. Bengue, Inc., 25 N.J. 359, 136
A.2d 626 (1957) (lighting cigarette after use of ointment with inflammable vapor).
269. Lawson v. Benjamin Ansehl Co., 180 S.W.2d 751 (Mo. App. 1944); accord,
Hentschel v. Baby Bathinette Corp., 215 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1954) (bathinette with
supports of magnesium alloy exposed to temperature of 1100 degrees) ; Moore v. Jefferson
Distilling & Denaturing Co., 169 La. 1156, 126 So. 691 (1930) (lighting match to look
into oil drums) ; Stevens v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 151 Kan. 638, 100 P.2d 723 (1940)
(dangerous method of controlling agricultural implement); Schfranek v. Benjamin Moore
& Co., 54 F.2d 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1931) (stirring wall decorating compound with the finger);
Dalton v. Pioneer Sand & Gravel Co., 37 Wash. 2d 946, 227 P.2d 173 (1951) (kneeling
on wet ready-mix cement).
270. Sawyer v. Pine Oil Sales Co., 155 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1946).
271. Pabellon v. Grace Line, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
272. Dubbs v. Zak Bros. Co., 38 Ohio App. 299, 175 N.E. 626 (1931).
273. Cheli v. Cudahy Bros. Co., 267 Mich. 690, 255 N.W. 414 (1934); Vaccarino
v. Cozzubo, 181 Md. 614, 31 A.2d 316 (1943); Silverman v. Swift & Co., 141 Conn.
450, 107 A.2d 277 (1954) ; Eisenbach v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 281 N.Y. 474, 24 N.E.2d 131
(1939) ; Feinstein v. Daniel Reeves, Inc., 14 F. Supp. 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1936) ; Zorger v.
Hillman's, 287 Ill. App. 357, 4 N.E2d 900 (1936).
274. McSpedon v. Kunz, 271 N.Y. 131, 2 N.E2d 513 (1936); Holt v. Mann, 294
Mass. 21, 200 N.E. 403 (1936).
275. Frankes, Inc. v. Bennett, 201 Ark. 649, 146 S.W2d 163 (1941); Stanton v.
Sears Roebuck & Co., 312 Ill. App. 496, 38 N.E.2d 801 (1942); Ross v. Porteous,
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be qualified to the extent that he is required to take into account allergies
common to a substantial portion of the population.'T This in turn must be
qualified by his reasonable right to assume that those who have a common
allergy-for example, to strawberries-wiU be aware of the fact, and will take
measures to protect themselves, so that a warning on the label may be all that
is required of him. 7
In other words, the problem is reduced to one of what the consumer has
a right to expect, which is a product reasonably fit for the purposes for which
it is sold; and strict liability should call for no different conclusion.
The same answer may very well be given as to the effect, in general, of an
obvious defect or danger in the chattel, or of a latent one as to which the user
is warned. Few products can ever be made entirely safe, and the producer
cannot be made an insurer of every one who may possibly be hurt. The best
meat will spoil if it is not refrigerated, and the finest automobile ever made
is a thing of terrible danger if it is inexpertly driven or repaired. Machinery
does not necessarily become utterly unfit for sale or use, and outlawed from
the market, because its rollers are not guarded; - 78 and when the use involves
latent dangers, and proper directions and warnings are given, 9 the user
ordinarily may reasonably be expected and required to comply with them.
Mitchell & Braun Co., 136 Me. 118, 3 A.2d 650 (1939) (dictum); Graham v. Jordan
Marsh Co., 319 Mass. 690, 67 N.E2d 404 (1946); Karr v. Inecto, Inc., 247 N.Y. 360,
160 N.E. 398 (1928) (dictum) ; Barrett v. S. S. Kresge Co., 144 Pa. Super. 516, 19 A2d
502 (1941); Walstrom Optical Co. v. Miller, 59 S..72d 895 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933);
Bennett v. Pilot Products Co., 120 Utah 474, 235 P2d 525 (1951); Zager v. F. W.
Wfoolworth Co., 30 Cal. App. 2d 324, 86 P.2d 389 (Dist. CL App. 1939); Merrill v.
Beaute Vues Corp., 235 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1956).
276. Gerldn v. Brown & Sehler Co., 177 Mich. 45, 61, 143 N.V. 48, 53 (1913);
Bianchi v. Denholm & McKay Co., 302 Mass. 469, 19 N.E.2d 697 (1939); Zirpola v.
Adam Hat Stores, Inc., 122 NJ.L. 21, 4 A2d 73 (Ct Err. & App. 1939); Taylor v.
Newcomb Baking Co., 317 Mass. 609, 59 N.E.2d 293 (1945) (dictum); see Barasch,
Allergies and the Law, 10 BRoosa yx L. Rv. 363 (1941); Cull, Allergy and the Lat, 12
Ins. Counsel J., July, 1945, p. 45; Horowitz, Allergy of the Plaintiff as a Defense in
Actions Based Upon Breach of Implied Warranty of Quality, 24 So. CAL. L R. 221
(1951); Comment, 49 Mic. L. REv. 253 (1950).
277. See Wright v. Carter Prods., 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957); Braun v. Roux Dis-
tributing Co., 312 S.W2d 758 (Mo. 1958) ; Noel, The Duty To Want Allergic Users of
Prodtcts, 12 VAxD. L. Ruv. 331 (1959); Dillard & Hart, Products Liability: Directions
for Use and the Duty To Want, 41 VA. L. REv. 145 (1955); Dic mso,, PaoDucrs
LiABur AND THE FOOD CNsuamm 224-30 (1951).
278. See Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950); Stevens v. Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 151 Kan. 638, 100 P2d 723 (1940); Yaun v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg.
Co., 253 Wis. 558, 34 N.W.2d 853 (1948); cf. Dempsey v. Virginia Dare Stores, 239
Mo. App. 355, 186 S.V.2d 217 (1945) ; Sawyer v. Pine Oil Sales Co., 155 F.Zd 855 (5th
Cir. 1946).
279. Tingey v. E. F. Houghton & Co., 30 Cal. 2d 97, 179 P.2d 807 (1947) ; Richardson
v. De Luca, 53 So. 2d 199 (La. Ct App. 1951); Foster v. Ford Motor Co., 139 Wash.
341, 246 Pac. 945 (1926) ; Shaw v. Calgon, Inc., 35 N.J. Super. 319, 114 A.2d 278 (1955) ;
Charles Lomori & Son v. Globe Lab., 35 Cal. App. 2d 248, 95 P2d 173 (Dist. Ct. App.
1939).
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It is only when the product is too dangerous to use at all,280 or the warning
may reasonably be expected to be inadequate, 281 that the maker becomes
liable for negligence. Again there is nothing in the strict liability to call for
any different rule.
Another question which has not been considered-perhaps because most
of the goods have been sold in sealed containers-is the effect of misconduct
of the intermediate dealer upon the strict liability of the manufacturer or
wholesaler. Here again the negligence action offers some guide. It is well
settled that the dealer's mere negligence, in failing to discover the defect,2
82
or to take precautions against its existence, 8 8 will not relieve the maker of
liability. On the other hand, where the dealer in fact discovers the danger,'
2 4
or is notified of jt,285 and deliberately proceeds to pass the product along with-
out warning, it is generally held that his responsibility supersedes that of the
maker, who is no longer regarded as the "proximate cause" of the injury.
There are, however, a few cases in which the product sold has been such an
extremely dangerous one, and so utterly unfit for its intended use, that it has
been 'held that the original seller was not relieved of liability even by such
actual discovery. 28 6 Again the policy of protection of the public is evident,
and such decisions are likely to 'be carried over into strict liability.
280. Cf. Kentucky Independent Oil Co. v. Schnitzler, 208 Ky. 507, 271 S.W. 570
(1925) ; Frazier v. Ayres, 20 So. 2d 754 (La. Ct. App. 1945); Clement v. Crosby & Co.,
148 Mich. 293, 111 N.W. 745 (1907).
281. Maize v. Atlantic Refining Co., 352 Pa. 51, 41 A.2d 850 (1945) (inconspicuous);
McClanahan v. California Spray-Chemical Corp., 194 Va. 842, 75 S.E2d 712 (1953)
(instructions in pamphlet and on label conflicting) ; Karsteadt v. Philip Gross Hardware
& Supply Co., 179 Wis. 110, 190 N.W. 844 (1922) (inadequate instructions to inexper-
ienced user) ; J. C. Lewis Motor, Inc., v. Williams, 85 Ga. App. 538, 69 S.E.2d 816 (1952)
(user knew tractor lacked exhaust deflector but did not appreciate dangers of carbon
monoxide); Crist v. Art Metal Works, 230 App. Div. 114, 243 N.Y. Supp. 496 (1930)
(sparks emitted by toy pistol, danger of igniting clothing).
282. Rosebrock v. General Electric Co., 236 N.Y. 227, 140 N.E. 571 (1923) ; Ellis
v. Lindmark, 177 Minn. 390, 225 N.W. 395 (1929); Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick Co., 19i
Wis. 196, 218 N.W. 855 (1928); Herman v. Markham Air Rifle Co., 258 Fed. 475 (E.D.
Mich. 1918) ; Pierce v. Ford Motor Co., 190 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1951) ; Colvin v. John
Powell & Co., 163 Neb. 112, 77 N.W.2d 900 (1956); Willey v. Fyrogas Co., 363 Mo.
406, 251 S.W.2d 635 (1952).
283. Cf. Burk v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 126 Iowa 730, 102 N.W. 793 (1905):
Moehlenbrock v. Parke, Davis & Co., 141 Minn. 154, 169 N.W. 541 (1918); Farrell v.
G. 0. Miller Co., 147 Minn. 52, 179 N.W. 566 (1920).
284. Stultz v. Benson Lumber Co., 6 Cal. 2d 688, 59 P2d 100 (1936); Catlin v.
Union Oil Co., 31 Cal. App. 597, 161 Pac. 29 (Dist. Ct. App. 1916); Olds Motor Works
v. Shaffer, 145 Ky. 616, 140 S.W. 1047 (1911).
285. Ford Motor Co. v. Wagoner, 183 Tenn. 392, 192 S.W.2d 840 (1946); Trust
Co. v. Lewis Auto Sales, Inc., 306 Ill. 132, 28 N.E2d 300 (1940); Harper v. Remington
Arms Co., 156 Misc. 53, 280 N.Y. Supp. 862 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 248 App. Div. 713, 20
N.Y. Supp. 130 (1936); E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Ladner, 221 Miss. 378,
73 So. -d 249 (1954).
286. Kentucky Independent Oil Co. v. Schnitzler, 208 Ky. 507, 271 S.W. 570 (1925)
(kerosene mixed with gasoline); Clement v. Crosby & Co., 148 Mich. 293, Ill N.W.
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WEAT DEFENsEs?
There has been very little consideration of the effect of the plaintiff's own
unreasonable conduct as a defense. There are four decisions 27 in which the
court has said flatly that his contributory negligence is no defense to an action
founded on a "warranty" to the ultimate user. On the other hand, it has been
said repeatedly, in actions upon a direct warranty to the injured purchaser, that
contributory negligence will -bar the action.2as The confusion is merely part of
the general murk which surrounds "warranty," and is another indication that
that unhappy word is a source of trouble in this connection. If "warranty" is
a matter of contract, or equally if it is one of strict liability in tort, how can
contributory negligence be a defense when the action is not one for negligence ?
When the cases are examined, however, they fall into a very consistent pat-
tern, and it is only their language which is confusing. Those which refuse to
allow the defense -have been cases in which the plaintiff negligently failed to
discover the defect in the product, or to guard against the possibility of its
existence. They are entirely consistent with the general rule that such negli-
745 (1907) (explosive stove polish) ; Farley v. Edward E. Tower & Co., 271 Mass. 230,
171 N.E. 639 (1930) (inflammable combs for heat treatment in beauty shop).
287. Challis v. Hartoff, 136 Kan. 823, 18 P.2d 199 (1933) (poisonous flour; allega-
tion of contributory negligence in pleading, details not stated, but quite unlikely that
plaintiff discovered its character) ; Simmons v. Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 181 Kan.
35, 309 P.2d 633 (1957) (failure -to discover matches in beverage) ; Bahlman v. Hudson
Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 NAV. 309 (1939) (express wvarranty of unisteel
top of car; negligent driving causing turnover) ; Hansen v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,
276 F2d 254 (6th Cir. 1960) (driving on defective tire) ; cf. Friend v. Childs Dining Hall
Co., 231 Mass. 65, 120 N.E. 407 (1918) (direct warranty by restaurant; failure to discover
pebbles in beans).
288. Nelson v. Anderson, 245 Minn. 445, 72 NAV.2d 861 (1955) (continuing to use
oil burner after notice that it was smoking) ; Hitchcock v. Hunt, 28 Conn. 343 (1859)
(using barrels to store pork after discovery that they were leaking); Cedar Rapids &
I.C. Ry. & Light Co. v. Sprague Electric Co., 203 Ill. App. 424, aff'd, 280 II. 386, 117
N.E. 461 (1917) (use of electric shovel after discovery of dangerous defects) ; Bruce v.
Fiss, Doerr & Carroll Horse Co., 47 App. Div. 273, 62 N.Y. Supp. 96 (1900) (use of
horse discovered to be dangerous); McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v. Nicholson, 17
Pa. Super. 188 (1901) (use of rope after it had broken); Eisenbach v. Gimbel Bros.,
Inc., 281 N.Y. 474,24 N.E.2d 131 (1939) (improper cooking of pork by experienced cook) ;
Bates v. Fish Bros. Wagon Co., 50 App. Div. 38, 63 N.Y. Supp. 649 (1900) (use of steam
heating apparatus after discovery of defects); Tomita v. Johnson, 49 Idaho 643, 290
Pac. 395 (1930) (planting seeds after discovery they were the wrong kind); Pauls Valley
Milling Co. v. Gabbert, 182 Okla. 500, 78 P2d 685 (1938) (same); Topekm Mill & Ele-
vator Co. v. Triplett, 168 Kan. 428, 213 P.2d 964 (1950) (dictum) (use of chicken feed
known to be defective); Walker v. Hickory Packing Co., 220 N.C. 158, 16 S.E.2d 668
(1941) (eating biscuits made of lard smelling like carrion); Missouri Bag Co. v.
Chemical Delinting Co., 214 Miss. 13, 58 So. 2d 71 (1952) (use of bags known to be
defective); Finks v. Viking Refrigerators, Inc., 235 Mo. App. 699, 147 S. 2d 124
(1941) (use of refrigerator meat showcase known to be defective); cf. Fredenhall v.
Abraham & Straus, 279 N.Y. 146, 18 N.E.2d 11 (1938) (use of cleaning fluid in small
unventilated bathroom after warning).
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gence is not a defense in an action founded on strict liability28 Those which
have permitted -the defense all have been cases in which the plaintiff has dis-
covered the defect and the danger, and has proceeded nevertheless to make
use of the product. They represent the form of contributory negligence which
consists of deliberately and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known
danger, and is quite often treated as assumption of risk. It is quite well settled
that this is a defense against other actions based upon strict liability.2"° Again
it appears probable that ordinary rules applicable to the tort action will be
carried over.
CONCLUSION
The assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these days apace.
289. Muller v. McKesson, 73 N.Y. 195, 29 Am. Rep. 123 (1878) (dog); Sandy v.
Bushey, 124 Me. 320, 128 Atl. 513 (1925) (horse) ; Burke v. Fischer, 298 Ky. 157, 182
S.W2d 638 (1944); Fake v. Addicks, 45 Minn. 37, 47 N.W. 450 (1890) (dictum);
Wojewoda v. Rybarczyk, 246 Mich. 641, 225 N.W. 555 (1929); Stackpole v. Healy, 16
Mass. 33 (1819); Evins v. St. Louis & S.F.R.R., 104 Ark. 79, 147 S.W. 452 (1912);
Bowman v. Humphrey, 132 Iowa 234, 109 N.W. 714 (1906); Niagara Oil Co. v. Ogle,
1.77 Ind. 292, 98 N.E. 60 (1912) ; Hoffman v. City of Bristol, 1.13 Conn. 386, 155 Atl. 499
(1931) (dictum).
290. Arthur v. Merchants' Ice & Cold Storage Co., 173 Cal. 646, 161 Pac. 121 (1916);
Cooper v. Robert Portner Brewing Co., 112 Ga. 894, 38 S.E. 91 (1900) ; Armington v.
Providence Ice Co., 33 R.I. 484, 82 Atd. 263 (1912) ; Bowles v. Indiana Ry. Co., 27 Ind.
App. 672, 62 N.E. 94 (1901) ; Opelt v. Al G. Barnes Co., 41 Cal. App. 776, 183 Pac. 241
(1919); Ervin v. Woodruff, 119 App. Div. 603, 103 N.Y. Supp. 1051 (1907); Hosmer v.
Carney, 228 N.Y. 73, 126 N.E. 650 (1920); Brown v. Barber, 26 Tenn. App. 534, 174
S.W.2d 298 (1943); Goodwin v. E. B. Nelsoi Grocery Co., 239 Mass. 232, 132 N.E. 51
(1921); Hughey v. Fergus County, 98 Mont. 98, 37 P2d 1035 (1934); Heidemann v.
Wheaton, 72 S.D. 375, 34 N.W.2d 492 (1948); Gomes v. Byrne, 51 Cal. 2d 418, 333
P.2d 754 (1959) ; Worth v. Dunn, 98 Conn. 51, 62, 118 Atl. 467, 471 (1922) ; Wells v.
Knight, 32 R.I. 432, 80 Atl. 16 (1911).
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